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      Abstract 
This study examines the “Spanish” influenza pandemic of 1918-1919 in the U.S. South, 
using case-studies of Jacksonville, Savannah, New Orleans, and Nashville to sculpt a “Southern 
flu” more identical to the Global South and the developing world than the rest of the U.S. I examine 
poverty and political and economic paralysis in the years between the end of Reconstruction and 
1918, and the poor results of political indifference on public health and disease control. I also 
analyze the social and institutional racism against persons of color that defined high infectious 
disease mortality in Southern cities. 
I argue that Southerners faced higher flu mortality than other parts of the country due to 
the regional poverty and public health underdevelopment that defined previous diseases and made 
the South distinct in the national epidemiological narrative, namely through yellow fever, malaria, 
hookworm, and pellagra. I also challenge the conventional orthodoxy by arguing that within the 
South, African Americans faced exorbitant mortality rates compared to whites. I argue against the 
myth of a democratic killer flu, but rather, the existence of deep social inequalities and inequities 
that furthered mortality among the impoverished and marginalized. I argue that the pandemic was 
like most epidemics and pandemics in Western history, in that it disproportionately killed 
minorities and those without access to medical care and social services due to conducive social 
architecture. While pestilence shapes societies, societies simultaneously shape the course of 
pestilence. 
This study is divided into five chapters. An introductory chapter examines the scholarship 
and Southern public health before 1918. The second chapter addresses the pandemic in 
Jacksonville and Savannah, the third chapter examines New Orleans, and the fourth chapter 
assesses Nashville. A concluding chapter compares the U.S. South with the Global South, tethering 
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   Formulas 
Mortality Rate: To calculate mortality rate, deaths (d) are divided by population (p), and 
multiplied by 10^n to convert the dividend from a fraction, with the n power variable typically 
being “3” to calculate the rate per 1,000 individuals. This formula computes the rate of death in a 
given population. Use the following equation: 
𝑑
𝑝
∙ 10𝑛  = Mortality Rate, or Death Rate 
Case-Fatality Rate: To calculate case-fatality rate, deaths (d) are divided by cases (c), which is 
then multiplied by 100 to provide a percentage. This formula computes the rate of death in any 
given number of cases, to determine disease’s lethality. Use the following equation: 
𝑑
𝑐
∙ 100  = Case-Fatality Rate 
 
 




     Introduction: The 1918 Flu Pandemic 
For centuries, infectious diseases have wrought suffering on human populations, 
mobilizing societies against disease via treatment, prevention, and eradication. Analyzing the 
evolving medical epistemology on infection and subsequent public health practice reveals 
intricacies about communal social stratification, as human interaction is the medium facilitating 
disease; members of society must engage with one another for pathogens to spread or be stopped. 
Faced with an epidemic, a community must decide how to respond and who receives what kind of 
care. An epidemic’s course illuminates how corners of society experience disease differently, 
based on medical care access and public health infrastructure conditions. Thus, this thesis argues 
that epidemics shape societies, while societies simultaneously shape the course of epidemics. 
The Southern United States is the quintessential historical laboratory for examining this 
concomitant direction and redirection of society and sickness, and is best, albeit seldom in the 
historiography, studied in the 1918 H1N1 influenza pandemic, misnamed the “Spanish” flu.1 The 
virus’s ancestry was avian, emerging from the enteric tracts of waterfowl like ducks and geese, 
where all recognized type A influenza viruses exist.2 It infected over 500 million people and killed 
between 50 and 100 million worldwide, including 675,000 Americans, obtaining the status of 
 
1 Due to Spain’s neutrality during World War I and freedom from press censorship, the country published the 
pandemic’s initial newspaper reports. The pandemic was not Spanish. See Antoni Trilla, Guillem Trilla, and Carolyn 
Dear, “The 1918 ‘Spanish Flu’ in Spain,” Clinical Infectious Diseases 47, no. 5 (September 2008): 668. Flu 
pandemics have an illustrious history preceding 1918. See Burke A. Cunha, “Influenza: Historical Aspects of 
Epidemics and Pandemics,” Infectious Disease Clinics of North America 18, no. 1 (2004): 141-155, and Youri 
Ghendon, “Introduction to Pandemic Influenza through History,” European Journal of Epidemiology 10, no. 4 
(August 1994): 451-453. 
2 David M. Morens, Jeffery K. Taubenberger, Hillery A. Harvey, and Matthew J. Memoli, “The 1918 Influenza 
Pandemic: Lessons for 2009 and the Future,” Critical Care Medicine 38 (April 2010): 12. Pandemic flu occurs when 
a strain’s hemagglutinin (HA) proteins mutate and are unrecognized by human immunity. These HA genes belong to 
flu viruses in wild birds. This genetic material mixes with strains infectious to humans through a process called 
reassortment. Pigs are the intermediary between avian and human flu strains, initiating pandemic flu. See Ann H. 
Reid and Jeffery K. Taubenberger, “The Origin of the 1918 Pandemic Influenza Virus: A Continuing Enigma,” 




“mother of all pandemics.”3 The virus mothered the 1957 (H2N2) and 1968 (H3N2) flu strains, 
circulating between swine and human hosts as early as 1911.4 It may have emerged from Haskell 
County, Kansas in January 1918, 300 miles west of US Army Camp Funston at Fort Riley, where 
the first outbreak was reported in March 1918.5 That outbreak catalyzed three waves, first between 
March and July 1918 with unexceptional mortality, second between September and December 
1918 with extraordinary mortality, and a final, mild wave in January 1919.6 The second wave was 
catastrophic.7 The flu was peculiar because, unlike typical flu trends, most victims died between 
the ages 20 and 40, forming a “W” shaped mortality curve instead of the usual “U.”8 One 
explanation is that younger people had stronger immune systems, seized by the virus in a cytokine 
storm, cytokines being proteins involved in immune system signaling. Upon infecting the lungs, it 
presumably generated an overstimulation, catalyzing “a deadly feedback loop” where, in the lungs, 
cell accumulation blocked off the airway.9 Patients drowned in their own fluids.  
 
3 Jeffery K. Taubenberger and David M. Morens, “1918 Influenza: The Mother of All Pandemics,” Emerging 
Infectious Diseases 12, no. 1 (January 2006): 15. 
4 Gavin J. D. Smith, Justin Bahl, Dhanasekaran Vijaykrishna, Jinxia Zhang, Leo L. M. Poon, Honglin Chen, 
Robert G. Webster, J. S. Malik Peiris, and Yi Guan, “Dating the Emergence of Pandemic Influenza Viruses,” PNAS 
106, no. 28 (14 July 2009): 11709. The flu was also an epizootic. See Jefferey K. Taubenberger, “The Origin and 
Virulence of the 1918 ‘Spanish’ Influenza Virus,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 150, no. 1 
(March 2006): 86-112, and V. Kuchipudi and Ruth H. Nissly, “Novel Flu Viruses in Bats and Cattle: ‘Pushing the 
Envelope’ of Influenza Infection,” Veterinary Sciences 5, no. 3 (September 2018): 71-81.  
5 John M. Barry, “Commentary: The Site of Origin of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic and its Public Health 
Implications,” Journal of Translational Medicine 2, no. 3 (2004): 2. 
6 C. W. Potter, “A History of Influenza,” Journal of Applied Microbiology 91, no. 4 (October 2001): 575. See also 
Ann H. Reid, Jeffery K. Taubenberger, and Thomas G. Fanning, “The 1918 Spanish Influenza: Integrating History 
and Biology,” Microbes and Infection 3, no. 1 (January 2001): 81-87. 
7 N.P. Johnson and J. Mueller, “Updating the Accounts: Global Mortality of the 1918-1920 ‘Spanish’ Influenza 
Pandemic,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 76, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 107. 
8 Jeffrey Luk, Peter Gross and William W. Thompson, “Observations on Mortality during the 1918 Influenza 
Pandemic,” Clinical Infectious Diseases 33, no. 8 (October 2001): 1375. See also Jeffrey K. Taubenberger, Johan V. 
Hultin, and David M. Morens, “Discovery and Characterization of the 1918 Pandemic Influenza Virus in Historical 
Context,” Antiviral Therapy 12, no. 4, Pt. B (2007): 581-591, Maarten van Wijhe, Mathias Mølbak Ingholt, Viggo 
Andreasen, and Lone Simonsen, “Loose Ends in the Epidemiology of the 1918 Pandemic: Explaining the Extreme 
Mortality Risk in Young Adults,” American Journal of Epidemiology 187, no. 12 (December 2018): 2503–2510. 
9 Ali S. Khan, The Next Pandemic: On the Frontlines Against Humankind’s Gravest Dangers (New York: Public 
Affairs, 2016), 12. See also Jennifer R. Tisoncik, Marcus J. Korth, Cameron P. Simmons, Jeremy Farrar, Thomas R. 
Martin and Michael G. Katze, “Into the Eye of the Cytokine Storm,” Microbiology and Molecular Biology Reviews 




By 1918, the U.S. South had a unique history of disease, poverty, and racial stratification, 
shaping the flu’s impact on Southerners.10 These provincial elements contributed to exorbitant 
mortality among the impoverished, especially persons of color. Racism existed in Northern cities 
and amplified mortality in places like Philadelphia, but Northern cities did not suffer the de jure 
segregation embedded in its infrastructure and the poverty borne thereof.11 This abject and cyclical 
underdevelopment contributed to Southern distinction from the national narrative.12 Southerners 
retained memories of nineteenth-century epidemics and unorthodox healing methods in the 
absence of reliable medical infrastructure to fight the flu. Simultaneously, racist medical and public 
health practice necessitated high black mortality.13 This study complicates the historiography by 
examining Southern poverty, underdevelopment, and its racial undercurrents. Historians posited 
that the flu indiscriminately killed Americans without regard to social dimension. While the flu 
may have been a democratic infector, it was not the democratic killer they suggested. This thesis 
argues the existence of a distinctly Southern manifestation of the flu through high mortality, 
wrought by poverty, underdevelopment, racism, and de jure segregation, using case studies of 
Jacksonville, New Orleans, and Nashville. These cities reflect the pandemic’s distinction in the 
South through poverty’s exacerbation of its impact, the persistence of Southern disease ecology in 
collective memory, the reliance on backwoods medicine in the absence of medical care, and the 
racist cultural construction of disease against Southern black bodies, before, during, and after 1918.  
 
10 Diane D. Ross, “Influenza Epidemic of 1918,” The New Encyclopedia of Southern Culture: Vol. 22: Science and 
Medicine (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), ed. J. G. Thomas and C. R. Wilson, 212-214. 
11 For more on Philadelphia, see Christina M. Stetler, “The 1918 Spanish Influenza: Three Months of Horror in 
Philadelphia,” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 84, no. 4, Special Issue: Pennsylvania and 
the Great War, Part 2 (Autumn 2017): 462-487. 
12 This thesis refrains from the phrase “Deep South” because Nashville is an Upper South city that dealt similarly 
with the pandemic in Deep South cities.  
13 This study focuses on mortality. Morbidity refers to incidence of illness while mortality refers to incidence of 
death. Studies have explored socioeconomic dimensions of 1918 flu morbidity with varying results. See Svenn-Erik 
Mamelund, “1918 Pandemic Morbidity: The First Wave Hits the Poor, The Second Wave Hits the Rich,” Influenza 




This study attempted to fuse quantitative and qualitative methods to examine the flu in the 
South. The methodologies of historical epidemiology and the social history of medicine buttressed 
and ratified each other’s findings. To address mortality quantitatively, this thesis emphasized 
mortality rates over raw mortality numbers. Mortality rates address the impact of disease on a 
community proportional and relative to community size. Mortality rates were preferable to raw 
mortality numbers because raw numbers sometimes mask the impact of death by drawing attention 
to the number of dead. Data was collected from period health reports from the cities under 
examination. The committees who authored them segregated data by race. One limitation to the 
reports was that poor whites were included in the broadly-defined “white” data, and thus, data 
specific to impoverished whites was impossible to break down. Poor whites were included in the 
data, but exactly how many remained unknown, because city officials did not specifically define 
them in their own class. Their experience may be comparable to those of impoverished African 
Americans. Qualitatively, this thesis relied on sources such as period newspapers, federal, state, 
municipal, and private agency health reports, and personal correspondence through letters and 
diaries to contextualize the pandemic in ways quantitative methods cannot.  
Dual Historiographies: Evolving Perspectives on the Flu and the New South 
Epidemiological history has grown since the twentieth century, as has the pandemic’s 
historiography. Scholarship was inexistent in its aftermath. Howard Phillips wrote in 2004 that the 
flu was veiled by the silence of historians in contrast to their interest in World War I. Although 
historians experienced both events, Phillips wrote that “they deemed a world war to be suitable as 
a subject for historians but not a world pandemic.”14 The first works were written by physicians 
and health officials documenting the medical perspective “lest the pandemic return within months” 
 
14 Howard Phillips, “The Re-appearing Shadow of 1918: Trends in the Historiography of the 1918-19 Influenza 




as was expected.15 The historical amnesia may be due to the virus’s rapid emergence and 
disappearance, and that the pandemic was tragic, inflicting terror at home rather than confined only 
in a war an ocean away. Histories of medicine were also defined by history departments in North 
America and Europe, who experienced lighter mortality than China and or India.16 The academies 
of the world’s wealthier regions wrote flu histories unappreciative of its total destructiveness. 
The first historical contributions were Adolph A. Hoehling’s The Great Epidemic (1961) 
and Richard Collier’s The Plague of the Spanish Lady (1974), after interest was catalyzed by the 
next two twentieth-century flu pandemics: the Asian flu (1957–1958) and Hong Kong flu (1968–
1969).17 These books introduced personal testimonies to understand the flu, but neither placed the 
pandemic in historical perspective. The first serious history was by Alfred W. Crosby, entitled 
Epidemic and Peace (1976).18 Crosby viewed history as biology, rather than merely politics or 
religion. He observed the virus’s impact on the war’s final months, tying it to the war’s outcome. 
This was like his other work. In The Columbian Exchange (1972) and Ecological Imperialism 
(1986), Crosby explored the decisiveness of smallpox in shaping New World colonization.19 
Epidemic and Peace was his attempt to situate the flu similarly for the first time. 
 Crosby’s history-biology synthesis was released alongside William H. McNeill’s Plagues 
and Peoples (1976), which initiated conversations about the nexus between social infrastructure 
 
15 David Killingray and Howard Phillips, The Spanish Influenza Pandemic of 1918-1919: New Perspectives (London 
& New York: Routledge, 2003), 13. 
16 Barbara Jester, Timothy M. Uyeki, Daniel B. Jernigan, Terrence M. Tumpey, “Historical and Clinical Aspects of 
the 1918 H1N1 Pandemic in the United States,” Virology 527 (January 2019): 33. 
17 Adolph A. Hoehling, The Great Epidemic: When the Spanish Influenza Struck (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1961). Richard Collier, The Plague of the Spanish Lady: The Influenza Pandemic of 1918-1919 (New 
York: Atheneum, 1974). 
18 Alfred W. Crosby, Epidemic and Peace, 1918 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1976).  
19 Alfred W. Crosby, The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492 (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 1972). Alfred W. Crosby, Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900-




and epidemiology.20 One reviewer wrote that after 1976 it became “acceptable” to view elements 
like urbanization and poverty as “decisive issues” in epidemiological history.21 Both books were 
byproducts of a late-1970s historiographical turn toward social, environmental, and medical 
history as “academically respectable subdisciplines,” necessitating fresh interest in the flu.22 The 
shapeshifting viral universe also initialized curiosity, following the Asian and Hong Kong flu 
pandemics, the 1976 American swine flu epidemic, and the 1980s AIDS pandemic. 
Epidemic and Peace was republished in 1989, in a new epidemiological battlefield 
dominated by AIDS, which demanded that policy focus on protecting everyone from the virus. In 
America’s Forgotten Pandemic (1989), Crosby traced the flu’s course through major American 
cities, and posited that the flu was a democratic killer that “ignored the differences” delineated by 
social dimensions, striking “them all down in similar proportions.”23 Epidemiological evidence 
says otherwise. A 2019 study noted that associations between socioeconomic status and pandemic 
outcomes “increases with outcome severity” because higher income and socioeconomic status 
indicate access to protective factors, like medical care, that reduce infection severity.24 India 
experienced a mortality range of 10 to 20 million in 1918, and a population loss of 13.8 million 
people in British-controlled territories.25 This contrasted the flu in developed nations. The 
association between underdevelopment, inequality and high mortality applied within the U.S. as 
well. A 2016 study illuminating the experience of impoverished Chicagoans concluded that the flu 
 
20 William H. McNeill, Plagues and Peoples (New York: Anchor Books, 1976). 
21 Johannes Sommerfeld, “Science & Society: Plagues and Peoples Revisited,” EMBO Reports 4 (2003): 32. 
22 Killingray and Phillips, The Spanish Influenza Pandemic of 1918-1919, 17. 
23 Alfred W. Crosby, America's Forgotten Pandemic: The Influenza of 1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), 323. 
24 Svenn-Erik Mamelund, Clare Shelley-Egan and Ole Rogeberg, “The Association Between Socioeconomic Status 
and Pandemic Influenza: Protocol for a Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis,” Systematic Reviews 8, no. 5 (2019): 
2. 
25 Siddharth Chandra and Eva Kassens-Noor, “The Evolution of Pandemic Influenza: Evidence from India, 1918–
19,” BMC Infectious Diseases 14, no. 510 (2014): 1. See Siddharth Chandra, Goran Kuljanin, and Jennifer Wray, 




did not behave in a “democratizing fashion at the within-city scale,” but rather, produced “spatial 
variation” in flu mortality “associated with sociodemographic factors.”26 This thesis approaches 
the U.S. South similarly, addressing social dimensions quantitatively and qualitatively to engage 
with the historiography and dispel the myth of a democratic killer flu. 
AIDS, the post-9/11 international security environment, and new viral phobias contributed 
to fresh scholarship. John Barry’s The Great Influenza (2004) followed attempts by American 
medical scientists to combat the flu and was succeeded by an investigation that reconstructed the 
virus from tissue samples of victims buried in Alaskan permafrost.27 These advances grew with 
the historiography. Carol R. Byerly’s Fever of War (2005) explored the U.S. military’s flu 
experience, which was amplified by the hubris of military leadership, in the years after the U.S. 
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.28 Whereas pandemics preceding 1918 spread along trade routes, 
the World War I’s permissive international context enabled the virus’s spread via troop and civilian 
mobilization, emboldened by the combat environment’s conditions.29 The 2009 swine flu 
pandemic and 2014 West African Ebola epidemic contextualized the historiography up to the 1918 
 
26 Kyra H. Grantz, Madhura S. Rane, Henrik Salje, Gregory E. Glass, Stephen E. Schachterle, and Derek A. T. 
Cummings, “Disparities in Influenza Mortality and Transmission Related to Sociodemographic Factors Within 
Chicago in the Pandemic of 1918,” PNAS 113, no. 48 (November 2016): 13842. See also Gerardo Chowell and 
Cecile Viboud, “Commentary: Pandemic Influenza and Socioeconomic Disparities: Lessons from 1918 Chicago,” 
PNAS 113, no 48 (November 2016): 13557 – 13559. See also G. Dennis Shanks and John F. Brundage, “Variable 
Mortality During the 1918 Influenza Pandemic in Chicago,” PNAS 114, no. 18 (May 2017): 3586–3587. See also 
Kyra H. Grantz, Madhura S. Rane, Henrik Salje, Gregory E. Glass, Stephen E. Schachterle, and Derek A. T. 
Cummings, “Reply to Shanks and Brundage: Many Plausible Mechanisms of Pandemic Mortality Disparities,” 
PNAS 114, no. 18 (May 2017): 3588–3589.  
27 John M. Barry, The Great Influenza: The Story of the Deadliest Pandemic in History (New York: Penguin, 2004), 
231-235. 2005 ed. Terrence M. Tumpey, Christopher F. Basler, Patricia V. Aguilar, Hui Zeng, Alicia Solorzano, 
David E. Swayne, Nancy J. Cox, Jacqueline M. Katz, Jeffery K. Taubenberger, Peter Palese, Adolfo Garcia-Sastre, 
“Characterization of the Reconstructed 1918 Spanish Influenza Pandemic Virus,” Science 310, no. 77 (October 7 
2005): 77. 
28 Carol R. Byerly, The Fever of War: The Influenza Epidemic in the U.S. Army During World War I (New York: 
New York University Press, 2005).  
29 Michaela E. Nickol and Jason Kindrachuk, “A Year of Terror and a Century of Reflection: Perspectives on the 
Great Influenza Pandemic of 1918–1919,” BMC Infectious Diseases 19, no. 117 (2019): 3. See also Anton Erkoreka, 
“Origins of the Spanish Influenza Pandemic (1918–1920) and its Relation to the First World War,” Journal of 




centennial. For example, Nancy K. Bristow’s American Pandemic (2016) explored the pandemic 
from the patient perspective, where sickness was experienced, building on prior articles.30  
The late-2010s also introduced the flu in global perspective. Laura Spinney’s Pale Rider 
(2017) and Catherine Arnold’s Pandemic 1918 (2018) brought international contextualization to 
the historiography, reflective of globalization and thus the contemporary viral threat.31 Future 
histories will likely be emblematic of the globalized environment, rekindling due to the 2018 
centennial’s resurrected interest in the Great War and its parallel pandemic. Historians will soon 
dissect not a series of “local epidemics, but one global pandemic.”32 However, one must be 
cautious. Experiences were uneven due to regional distinction. In the U.S., the Southern narrative 
has not yet enjoyed fruitful historical assessment. This inquiry is critical if historians are to glean 
anything more about the flu beyond its general history. Addressing the South forces historians to 
reckon with the pandemic’s social contours, implying realities in health policy historically ignored 
by developed nations: epidemics disproportionately kill the poor and marginalized.33 
Some have initiated this dialogue. Esyllt W. Jones’ Influenza 1918 (2007) and Patricia J. 
Fanning’s Influenza and Inequality (2010) pointed towards historiographical gaps neglecting 
 
30 Nancy K. Bristow, American Pandemic: The Lost Worlds of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 6. See also Nancy K. Bristow, “’It's as Bad as Anything Can Be’: Patients, Identity, and the 
Influenza Pandemic,” Public Health Reports 125, Supplement 3: (April 2010): 134-144. 
31 Laura Spinney, Pale Rider: The Spanish Flu of 1918 and How It Changed the World (New York: PublicAffiars, 
2017). Catharine Arnold, Pandemic 1918: Eyewitness Accounts from the Greatest Medical Holocaust in Modern 
History (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2018). 
32 Spinney, Pale Rider, 65.  
33 The best contemporary inquiry into the inequality-disease connection remains J. N. Hays, The Burdens of 
Disease: Epidemics and Human Response in Western History (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1998). 
Studies note that poverty is the largest factor in epidemic mortality globally, but has been ignored by policymakers 
and the medical community in favor of environmental or genetic factors. See Marcella M. Alsan, Michael 
Westerhaus, Michael Herce, Koji Nakashima and Paul E. Farmer, “Poverty, Global Health and Infectious Disease: 
Lessons from Haiti and Rwanda,” Infectious Disease Clinics of North America 25, no. 3 (September 2011): 611-
622. Others note that diseases contribute to cyclical poverty because of decreased productivity, with the most 
affected populations having fewer reliable resources and no access to medical care to combat illness. See Zulfiqar A. 
Bhutta, Johannes Sommerfeld, Zohra S. Lassi, Rehana A. Salam and Jai K. Das, “Global Burden, Distribution, and 




underdevelopment.34 In her analysis of Norwood, Massachusetts, Fanning found that the 
pandemic’s impact was borne by those without “access to the authoritative written word” – 
Americans too marginalized “to earn a place in America’s collective memory.”35 Using case 
studies in Canada and Massachusetts, Jones and Fanning argued that “impressions of 
indiscriminate death” resulted from disproportionate press coverage on prominent deaths, masking 
the fact that socioeconomic status was critical in determining “not so much who contracted the 
flu,” but who “died of it through a lack of adequate nursing and rest.”36 If an epidemic’s course is 
an indicator of social stratification, then the U.S. South in 1918 serves as an ideal historical attic 
historians should further raid. Future assessments may marry the social history of disease with the 
statistical “analysis of viral outbreaks,” preparing societies for future epidemics and pandemics.37 
The historiography of the South is equally as complex. “New South” economic, political, 
and social organization precipitated an environment conducive for high mortality.38 Old South 
diseases like yellow fever, malaria, hookworm, and pellagra continued to plague the New South. 
As war deaths were seared into Southern culture, so too were disease deaths.39 These illnesses 
separated the South and the rest of the nation and were amplified as a result of post-war economic 
upheaval. Todd L. Savitt and James H. Young argued in Disease and Distinctiveness in the 
 
34 Esyllt Wynne Jones, Influenza 1918: Disease, Death, and Struggle in Winnipeg (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2007). Patricia J. Fanning, Influenza and Inequality: One Town’s Tragic Response to the Great Epidemic of 
1918 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2010). 
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American South (1988) that by the Antebellum-period’s conclusion the South’s “reputation for 
poor health” was established by those diseases.40 This study argues that the 1918 flu also sculpted 
distinctiveness. Poverty-driven mortality and public health fragility afflicted the South differently 
than the North, with the unique persistence of de jure segregation. 
The amplification of pestilence occurred by post-war economic, political and social order. 
The Old South possessed its own “master/slave” market capitalism existing in “a world network 
of prices and markets” that contributed to what William N. Parker called a “paradox” that typified 
New World tropical economies for two to three centuries.41 This relationship extended beyond the 
agricultural, to the medical and biopolitical.42 Southern slave societies operated on a political and 
economic association keen on wage-less agrarian production. The Civil War overturned this 
system, and a free labor market penetrated the Southern economy, meeting resistance and 
generating the friction that necessitated underdevelopment by 1918. To Parker, the obstacles to 
labor’s movement out of the South, especially farming, and to capital’s moving in, lay upon the: 
The destruction of physical capital in the Civil War, the race prejudice of whites in North 
and South, the lack of a strong native commercial and industrial capitalism in the agrarian 
South, ignorance and prejudice of the mass of Northern capitalists, and the rapaciousness 
and acuity of a few. The Southern economy became fixed… in a mold of 
underdevelopment in the decades immediately after the Civil War. The South’s relative 
poverty was then perpetuated through the 1930s by the vicious circles familiar to students 
of poor countries and regions.43 
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Parker concluded this cyclical poverty “produced low public expenditures” on public health until 
human capital deteriorated, deepening “ignorance and confirming the immobility.”44 These forces 
separated Southern communities from one another as well.45 Studies posit the South is still the 
poorest and “most backward region” of the U.S., and the most racially diverse.46 
Reconstruction-era Southern politics sought to enforce Antebellum-style racial control. A 
political climate of “diffused terror and repression” through which whites controlled state 
administrations and a “biracial caste system” accentuated regional poverty.47 William M. Brewer 
wrote in 1930 that poor whites inherited lost slave society traditions intensified by “elevation of 
the slaves to citizenship,” and ensured that persons of color understood the will of white men to 
be law.48 These racist dreams saturated scientific and epidemiological discourse. In An Old Creed 
for the New South (1985), John D. Smith wrote that slavery’s metaphor was central to 
Reconstruction race-relations, perverting Darwinian and Lamarckian thought to prove that disease 
among freed slaves meant “the eventual elimination” of black people, and that without slavery as 
guardianship, African-Americans would suffer diseases “unknown to their race as slaves.”49  
In The Problem South (2012), Natalie J. Ring wrote that these race-disease anxieties had 
colonial underpinnings by physicians who simultaneously pondered nonwhite immunity to some 
diseases while implicating nonwhites in spreading those diseases.50 This Orwellian doublethink 
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continued into and beyond 1918, as physicians contemplated white and black immunity, 
reinforcing the racialized medical consensus.51 Thus, persons of color fortified white ruminations 
of a diseased South. Whites pointed to high black disease mortality without regard to 
socioeconomic status, while medical paternalism sought to tame disease and take steps “toward 
saving white civilization.”52 These practices buttressed segregation even after reformers oversaw 
hints of integration in cities like New Orleans.53 Such conditions shaped the flu’s course in 1918. 
This thesis seeks to enter the Southern case study into these dual historiographies.  
The Context of Diseases of Poverty in the South and the Nation 
American medical and epidemiological thought was evolving before 1918, and 
bacteriology filled the absence of virology while the South grappled with disease due its climate, 
geography, and poverty.54 In 1916, physicians William H. Deaderick and Loyd O. Thompson 
noted that while disease was not “confined” to the South, malaria, blackwater fever, amebic 
dysentery, hookworm, intestinal parasites, and pellagra were more prevalent in the South as in the 
poor communities of Italy and elsewhere.55 Southern medical thought was ossified as well, 
reluctant to incursions from “Yankee” medical thought in favor of “a truly southern medicine.”56 
From Reconstruction to the New Deal, nutrition declined for tenant and sharecropper families after 
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they abandoned gardens to grow cotton closer to their cabins due to sharecropping contracts, while 
mill workers subsisted on company store food, facilitating pellagra.57 Hookworm prospered among 
impoverished farming communities, especially in children due to shoeless travel.58 A 1902 report 
written by an S. C. Kershaw from hookworm expert Dr. Charles W. Stiles noted that infections 
were due to the “absence of privies” on farms, with defecation occurring within fifty meters from 
a residence, resulting in what Stiles called the “‘poor man’s’ malady” across the South.59 Public 
health practitioners failed to alert Southerners to the “this great burden of hookworm.”60  
Malaria was also amplified by underdevelopment. Though malaria once extended as far as 
New England, by the late nineteenth century it was a uniquely Southern disease.61 The Rockefeller 
Foundation battled malaria in the South and in poor communities worldwide. Seeking inexpensive 
malaria control methods, the foundation employed high school students to construct anti-mosquito 
screens for doors and windows, but the program was ineffective after one year. Surveyors found 
that most screens fell into disrepair, and that households changed rapidly, with migratory 
sharecropping families hopping from contract to contract, farm to farm, in search of better deals.62 
 Yellow fever also contributed to the myth of a backwards South. The environment 
producing tobacco, cotton, and sugar also facilitated the Aedes aegypti mosquito, which 
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transmitted yellow fever.63 Port cities like Jacksonville, New Orleans and Savannah battled 
epidemics throughout the nineteenth century. Jacksonville experienced a harsh epidemic in 1888, 
when cities launched quarantines against refugees and nurses recruited to Jacksonville were 
incompetent, arrested for drunkenness and striking.64 These epidemics were partly due to 
legislative indifference. Connections between sanitation and yellow fever were established by the 
Reconstruction era but were only of secondary importance. Physicians favored incorporating 
sanitation into public health but were unconvincing to legislators.65 Limited funding characterized 
Southern disease control. Commercial elites initiated policies that maximized profits while disease 
control “existed for convenience,” as wealth triumphed over health.66 Attempts to alleviate 
Southerners of disease only added to myths of “an unhealthful climate” and a diseased South.67 
The final appeal for Southern public health before the October 1918 flu wave appeared in 
an August 1918 Science article by Dr. Sigismund S. Goldwater (1873–1942), director of New York 
City’s Mount Sinai Hospital in 1917 and consultant to the U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS) in 
1918. Goldwater argued for a program that Woodrow Wilson had referred to the Treasury 
Department, which by then had “given no indication of formulating,” to focus on standardized 
disease control procedures adopted by local authorities with “special attention” to diseases that 
reduced Southern farm labor efficiency.68 Southern diseases drew interest, but action was hollow. 
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Poor economic conditions, lackadaisical interest from the wealthy and powerful, and porous health 
infrastructure precipitated an environment conducive for high flu mortality. 
Within Southern communities, racist ideas spread as rapidly as pestilence, emboldening 
racial hierarchies under prevailing biological assumptions.69 In 1910, Dr. H. M. Folkes of Biloxi, 
Mississippi wrote of “the negro as a health problem,” based on the idea that immunity “seldom 
applies to the negro.”70 Folkes spoke for a medical community that believed in hematological 
differences between “mulattoes, octoroons and quadroons” and the “pure-blooded negro,” where 
Americans of mixed race between black and white were more susceptible to disease than their 
“deeply tinted brethren.”71 However, even though “pure-blooded” African Americans presumably 
possessed immunity to diseases like influenza, they still carried pathogens threatening “pure 
Anglo-Celtic type of people.”72 Connected with the public health rule that “it is far better to prevent 
diseases than it is to wait to cure them,” Folkes reminded Southerners “born and bred” that it was 
important to guard against “miscegenation which would Africanize this country,” continuing that: 
It is a thousand times more difficult to get the negroes to grasp the idea that there may exist 
anything in microscopic life that could be a menace to their health… As an American man 
who loves his native land… and as a medical man, I warn the white people of this country 
against the insidious evil which to-day is sapping the very foundation of that Aryan blood 
which stands for the republican form of government and the highest type of civilization.73 
 
To Folkes, African Americans that were impure byproducts of miscegenation were unimmune to 
disease, while “pure-blooded negroes” were hardy and savage, asymptomatic carriers of it. Anti-
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miscegenation was a central public health objective in the South, connected with managing the 
racial future of the U.S. Folkes regarded disease control as race control, as racial myths connecting 
black bodies with disease prevalence ensured white hegemony. He typified this logic. In 1915, Dr. 
L. C. Allen of Hoschton, Georgia, feared that African Americans were bringing disease into white 
homes as domestic laborers and wrote that persons of color were not lazy, but loved carnal pleasure 
and lacked self-control. Allen thought slavery protected African Americans from tuberculosis (TB) 
and diseases of Southern ecology. His remedy to this addition to “’the white man’s burden’” was 
to blame persons of color for their “shiftlessness, ignorance, and poverty” and replace their 
presumed ineptitude with “systematic, disciplinary training of his physical, mental and moral 
powers.”74 To fight high African-American disease mortality, Allen’s colleague, Dr. A. G. Fort, 
argued in 1915 for better funding to protect persons of color because they could not protect 
themselves. He implicated their poverty as the conductor of disease.75  
Orwellian Doublethink and Epidemiological Epistemology: The Case of Savannah 
This synthesis between racism, epidemiology, and health policy in the Progressive era 
South is best examined in Savannah, which itself faced epidemics unique to the South and to 
poverty. The city is a historical laboratory for examining the development of Southern disease 
control programs, and the evolution of epidemiological thought guided by poverty and high 
African-American mortality rates to disease before 1918. An 1820 yellow fever epidemic seared 
images of corpse-filled carts into Savannahian memory, while remedies like fusions of “castor oil, 
mercury, blood-letting, snake root, bark, blistering, pepper, sugar of lead, brandy” remained 
ineffective.76 Yellow fever struck Savannah nine times after 1820. After the 1876 epidemic, Dr. 
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Louis Falligant recalled that “misery and woe found echo only in the wail of the mourner and the 
dull thud of the coffin.”77 Over a thousand Savannahians died, pushing authorities to introduce 
sewers, lowland drainage, garbage disposal, wells, and a sanitary department.78 
By 1900, public health and racial control in Savannah was inseparable. Historians have 
argued that segregation served as a “de facto quarantine” for African Americans, protecting them 
from disease by minimizing their pathogen exposure.79 This study argues the opposite. Segregation 
made African Americans more vulnerable to disease and the 1918 flu. With segregation came 
economic paralysis, marginalization, and for the poorest, squalid living conditions. Health 
departments recognized the correlation. In Savannah, smallpox reports between 1902 and 1904 
recorded an African-American smallpox morbidity rate fifteen times that of whites.80 A 1912 
report by Savannah’s health officer Dr. William F. Brunner estimated a city population of 36,000 
whites and 41,000 “colored and Negroes,” who he, like Folkes, differentiated between: 
It may be asked why the non-white population is divided into two classes, i.e., - colored 
and Negroes, and it is here stated that there is an essential difference in these two classes 
of people… from a sanitary basis… It is palpable that the African of unmixed blood is but 
a little over two hundred years from the jungle and he does not as yet thrive physically as 
a city dweller. The colored man, from his white blood, inherits a greater resistance to the 
diseases incidental to civilization, and when housed as the white people are. It is well worth 
the endeavors of the authorities of every Southern city to investigate a condition that must 
be faced and is fraught with the resulting evils to the white race… Can anyone read the 
figures quoted without observing that, if we have one race of people here with a death rate 
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nearly double that of the superior and controlling race, measures, not yet adopted, are 
necessary to remedy this evil.81 
 
Brunner noted that African-American TB cases outnumbered white TB cases three to one, while 
there were five African-American pneumonia cases for every one white pneumonia case. 
Emulating preventive medicine’s core doctrine to “fight the cause, not the effect,” Brunner 
advocated for “the segregation of infected people,” alluding to the perceived increasing 
“tuberculosis factories” of African-American neighborhoods.82 Consider the paradox of 
Progressive epidemiological racism before 1918. White supremacists yearned to reconstruct the 
Old South racial hierarchy, and with novel microbiological knowledge and social Darwinism, 
racism joined science. Science justified racial order, and disease control served as the channel by 
which physicians and authorities partook in molding that order in which immunologically-pure 
whites stood atop the pyramid, and persons of color buttressed the biological bottom. 
 These theories were irrational, but still materialized in the form of ineffective and 
detrimental policies for African Americans struggling in the lingering Old South biopolitical 
death-grip. Physicians, officials, and white supremacists debated African-American immunity to 
no result. Some argued black bodies were vulnerable to disease due to their presumed worthless 
immunocompetence. Others argued for the immunological hardiness of black bodies, toughened 
after centuries in the African jungle. Folkes’s miscegenation phobias were premised on the 
assumption that race-mixing would cause for white “descendants a Frankenstein monster.”83 He 
believed African-American immunity was armored due to the stereotype of an untamed African 
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disease ecology. To Folkes, African-American immunological fortitude was reflective of black 
biological and social inferiority. He argued that African-American immunity lost integrity when 
diluted by white blood, making “negro blood” more vulnerable to disease as long as race-mixing 
continued.84 Yet, Brunner wrote that black bodies inherited “greater resistance to the diseases 
incidental to civilization” when mixed with white blood and “housed as the white people are.”85 
Folkes can be described as a segregationist, and Brunner an assimilationist, and racist physicians 
in either school of thought could not decide whether miscegenation improved black immunology 
or undermined it. But empiricism was worthless, and Orwellian doublethink filled the gaps in 
senseless, yet ossified, Southern thought. Persons of color were inferior because of their resistance 
and vulnerability. This simultaneous inferiority characterized social architecture, and thus the 
pathways of infection and mortality. Often, it were segregationist and assimilationist physicians 
and officials who shaped responses to high black mortality into 1918. Regardless, white physicians 
wanted nothing to do with black patients. Dr. R. V. Harris, a city physician, lamented to the mayor 
that he was frequently and unfairly requested to treat more African Americans than whites, and 
that African Americans needed to rely on their own physicians for treatment.86  
In 1914, Brunner reported that total African-American mortality doubled total white 
mortality. There were five times more black TB deaths than white TB deaths, two times more 
black pneumonia deaths than white pneumonia deaths, and four times more black pellagra deaths 
than white pellagra deaths.87 Brunner noted that the mortality rate for African-American children 
was enormous, because a black child did “not have the same chance for its life that the white child 
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has.”88 He observed that African-American children lived in extraordinarily unsanitary conditions. 
In the city, they lived in alleyways or basements, and in segregated neighborhoods they lived in 
crowded slums. If fair housing laws were enacted, Brunner wrote, African-American child 
mortality “would be cut in half,” and the total African-American mortality rate alleviated.89 Whites 
had imposed restrictions on where African Americans could live, confining them to swampy areas 
where individuals were forced to fight the disease on their own, without social services like paved 
streets, sewers, and indoor plumbing, which would have alleviated some conditions.90  
But inequality and public health underdevelopment were symbiotic. According to Brunner, 
the “boll weevil, ticks on a cow, or hog cholera” received funding to develop laws, while human 
health protection never extended “beyond the salary of such persons, whose only qualifications 
are that they stand in with the political machine.”91 He knew Savannah required a capable health 
board, and his frustration with political indifference was not locally limited. Several miles from 
Savannah existed the USPH and Marine-Hospital Service (MHS) South Atlantic quarantine station 
at Black Beard Island, Georgia. Reports from 1914 indicated the station was without leadership 
since 1909, with Savannah only accessible via U.S. Coast Guard revenue cutter.92 The station 
began operations in 1888 and was abandoned by 1911 because its location made it impractical for 
enforcing quarantines, and because the property was “decaying from lack of attention,” with 
furnishings being dismantled and repurposed in homes without plumbing.93  
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Brunner’s woes went unheeded. Authorities were not interested in appropriating resources, 
but when they were, they sought to reproduce racial order. By 1915, African-American mortality 
was almost triple white mortality, and Brunner was irate. Officials had not installed the same 
“safeguards we place around the white population” in segregated neighborhoods, and unfair 
housing laws forced African Americans into unsanitary corners of the city, raising their TB and 
pneumonia mortality.94 Infant mortality was as abysmal. White babies were four times more likely 
to reach their first birthdays than black babies, and had “a five-to-one chance of being born alive 
over the Negro.”95 Brunner thought that “colored and Negro people” were progressing, but without 
white “sanitary and moral support,” their “progress must be retarded.”96 In an article that year, 
Brunner wrote that while he believed African Americans were ignorant, “their environments are 
such that they will always be ignorant,” because authorities were not alleviating the poverty 
wracking African-American neighborhoods, denying them “a square deal.”97 While espousing 
racist ideologies himself, Brunner attacked his colleagues who were “inclined to hold aloof from 
these people on account of racial superiority,” writing that if his fellow physicians and public 
health officials truly wanted to fight disease, then the “Southern man is the negro’s best friend.”98 
The policies downstream from racist epidemiological thought were ineffective in shielding 
impoverished whites and African Americans from the 1918 pandemic. One study analyzed 
mortality using intact death records and found that of 6,520 recorded deaths in the Savannah-
Chatham County region between 1917 and 1919, “influenza” was the cause of death in 316 cases 
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(4.85 percent of all deaths), 114 occurring in October 1918 (37 percent of total local flu deaths and 
4.69 percent of all local deaths that year), with almost one in ten deaths in 1918 due to the flu.99 
Incomplete reporting, differences between defined “influenza” and “pneumonia” deaths, and 
inaccurate documentation for African Americans indicate that mortality was likely much higher.100 
As will be shown later, these issues appeared in other Southern cities, like New Orleans. 
Georgian cities suffered heavily, particularly in military facilities where “coffins were 
stacked like cordwood.”101 But Savannah was also Old South slave port city, and like other 
Southern cities, racial inequities and inequalities were robust. These elements shaped the 
documentation of mortality. While the researchers in the aforementioned study concluded that race 
did not appear as a factor in Savannahian flu mortality, death registries suggested otherwise.102 
Handwritten documentation from the Health Officer’s Department by physicians responding to the 
virus captured the effects of segregation in raw mortality reporting and the assessments of later 
historians. While white deaths were reported a result of “la Grippe, pneumonia” and “pneumonia, 
influenza,” many African-American deaths were reported as simply “pneumonia,” “lobar 
pneumonia,” or “unknown.”103 The conventional orthodoxy suggesting that whites died more than 
African Americans, or that their deaths were comparable, is a flawed historical assumption based 
on the available statistics. In many cases, the absence and inaccuracy of records speak louder than 
previously thought, especially when capturing the experience of the impoverished and 
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marginalized. Savannah’s case is an introductory example of these reporting patterns, further 
examined in larger case studies of Jacksonville, New Orleans, and Nashville.  
Charles E. Rosenberg wrote that the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s may “be seen as a socio-
assay” of American institutions, systems, and culture.104 His thoughts apply to most epidemics and 
pandemics in history, including the 1918 flu. Richard J. Evans expanded on Rosenberg’s insight 
and wrote that the spread and impact of epidemics were, and still are, influenced by “social and 
political factors” affecting “different groups of people in different ways and to different 
degrees.”105 Savannah’s conditions were reflective of the social and political conditions, and 
epistemic currents, of Southern cities before 1918. The city’s case illuminated the epidemiological 
thought surrounding the contested nexus between poverty and high African-American mortality. 
The immuno-racial debate between segregationists like Folkes and assimilationists like Brunner 
were emblematic of the evolving epidemiology, concomitantly implicating African Americans in 
their own mortality while seeking solutions to municipal disease control problems, neglecting 
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       Chapter One: “You Are a Menace to Others”: The Flu and Jacksonville 
Jacksonville and Savannah simultaneously confronted Southern diseases, compounded by 
underdevelopment and inequality. Both were twin cities connected by rail, spreading late 
nineteenth-century yellow fever epidemics.106 Yellow fever struck Jacksonville in 1877, one year 
after the devastating 1876 outbreak in Savannah. In Fernandina, a September 1877 census 
indicated there were 1,146 infected people from a population of 1,632, and by mid-October 800 
panicked people fled Jacksonville within thirty-six hours.107 The virus reemerged in 1888, 
depopulating the city from 130,000 citizens to 14,000 within weeks as refugees fled north, while 
the rapid increase in cases shocked the nation.108 Of 4,656 reported cases, 427 died, and in 
response, the Florida State Board of Health was born.109 Floridians remembered their yellow fever 
epidemics when facing the 1918 flu, and relied on crude forms of treatment to fight the virus. The 
mortality Jacksonville faced was not large enough to enter the American historical and 
epidemiological narrative. Still, Jacksonville’s experience typified those of poverty, 
underdevelopment, and racism in other Southern cities, and its case study expressed the limitations 
of historical knowledge, and the warped historiographical consensus borne thereof.  
Floridians celebrated the courage of medical authorities in combatting the 1888 epidemic. 
One 1888 poem entitled Ye Heroes of Ye Epidemic consoled distraught citizens and celebrated 
medical capability, spotlighting the physicians who treated the sick.110 The poem romanticized 
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disease control, revealing how the effects of disease were crystallized in the Southern mind. Crude 
treatments were still relied upon. An 1888 yellow fever remedy advised sufferers to drink and 
“drench the bowels and stomach” with sea water while inhaling turpentine until “vomiting 
results.”111 Unorthodox Southern medicine continued in 1918, not only because of humble 
evolutions in biomedical knowledge, but as a result of poverty and underdevelopment, even when 
rhetoric hailed progressive medical order. They were not unorthodox as Southern phenomena, 
however, but were the Old South ways of treating the sick. If the results of these epidemics did not 
speak to the national and international community about Southern epidemiological conditions, it 
revealed characteristics about Southerners themselves, who enshrined “racism, xenophobia, 
violence, shotgun vigilantism, poverty, economic stagnation, ignorance, irrationality, resistance to 
modern science, and the usual defensiveness and hypersensitivity” in social constructions and in 
law.112 This was one way of blaming Southerners for diseases endemic to Southern ecology. 
Underdevelopment continued into the twentieth century, reflected in the condition of 
USPH and MHS quarantine stations servicing ports across Florida. Some stations experienced 
little activity and were suited for smaller objectives with the lack of manpower and resources. A 
1909 letter to Washington D.C. from acting assistant surgeon Dr. William O. Bell of the St. Johns 
River quarantine station in Mayport indicated that some of the active station property was “in 
general good repair” and that there was “little unserviceable property” impeding the duties of the 
USPHS.113 A 1914 report from the St. Johns River station indicated little station activity. The 
surgeon in charge, Dr. Neil Alford, wrote to Washington D.C. that station storage houses were 
“insufficient for storing supplies,” and that the station had no wharf, with “only one attendant” 
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operating the station.114 To Alford, this was sufficient enough to protect cities reliant on ships 
entering the river, because station buildings were in good condition, and the fumigating and 
disinfecting apparatus were effective, considering the port’s sleepy activity. 
But other quarantine stations in Florida were highly active and required attention from state 
and federal authorities to function properly. A 1909 letter to Washington D.C. indicated that 
service at the Punta Rassa quarantine station was conducted from the private office of Dr. G. R. 
Shultz for “which no rent is paid by the government,” as federal authorities owned nothing but the 
“stationery and quarantine flag” at the station.115 The St. George Sound quarantine station in 
Carrabelle required no repairs, because there were no buildings, station wharf, or floating property 
to repair, and office and supply tasks were conducted in rented spaces. “Disinfection and 
fumigation machinery” were limited to “sulphur pots and tubs” because the station served an 
inspection role, and ships were sent elsewhere if further intervention was required.116 The Tampa 
Bay quarantine station at Fort De Soto was destroyed by a fire in 1913, leaving personnel without 
mooring buoys, anchors, and a disinfecting wharf, all having sunk into the gulf, while other tools 
and property were “carried away during a heavy storm.”117 Most buildings at the Pensacola 
quarantine station were optimal, but personnel struggled to disinfect and fumigate ships because 
apparatus could only be transported so far, and cargo vessels could only approach within five to 
six miles of the station. A 1914 report lamented that the station was “too far from the line of 
navigation,” and that to better protect Pensacola, the station needed to be moved “four or five miles 
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nearer where loaded ships have to anchor.”118 The conditions of Florida’s quarantine stations were 
reflective of public health underdevelopment at the state and federal level. There was limited 
federal response to disease, compounding on the indifference of state and local authorities. 
In Jacksonville, inactive public health and inaccessible medical care coincided with the 
political marginalization of African Americans by whites, who sought to reverse what Robert 
Cassanello has seen as unrestricted African-American participation in the Reconstruction-era 
public sphere.119 Only thirty-three African-American doctors practiced in the city between 1900 
and 1918, increasing by only twenty-four percent while the African American population increased 
by fifty-seven percent.120 In 1912, Jacksonville’s health officer Dr. Charles E. Terry wrote that 
high African-American mortality harmed city growth and attractiveness, with the “negro race as a 
menace to our own a source and disseminator of infection.”121 He thought high African-American 
mortality was evidence of immunological inferiority, and that African Americans, having been “so 
recently removed from savagery,” were naturally an imitative race and they were therefore 
trainable on hygiene.122 He believed if whites engaged in supreme sanitation practices, African 
Americans could do the same. While implicating black bodies with high disease incidence and 
blaming African Americans for Jacksonville’s image, Terry also noted that most deaths were 
preventable had there been a physician in attendance. When there was a physician present, care 
was subpar when delivered by “ignorant physicians of their own race and the less well-equipped 
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members of the white fraternity.”123 By 1914, Terry found that white mortality in the South 
exceeded northern cities by 212 deaths per 100,000, and African-American mortality by 657 deaths 
per 100,000.124 James B. Crooks has written that, to remedy high African-American mortality, 
Terry requested midwifery for mothers, nurse education in white and black neighborhoods, and 
secured more financing for public health, because, while seventy-five cents per capita on health 
protection was the national average, Jacksonville spent only fifty cents per capita.125 
Whether segregationist or assimilationist, medical officials like Brunner and Terry were 
simultaneously progressive and racist. They recognized high African-American mortality and tied 
it to blackness, while implicating municipal ineptitude and inaccessible, oftentimes inexistent, 
medical care in their deaths. But they criticized political indifference not because they wanted to 
protect African Americans. It was because they wanted to protect white hegemony and pure white 
bodies from a problem easily transmissible in their cities. Disease-race associations were not fringe 
beliefs concentrated to the corners of science but were at the center of it. Nor was racist medicine 
practiced by lone xenophobic physicians. A xenophobic culture institutionalized racist medicine. 
Redefining Mortality in the ‘River City’ 
Late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century public health tribulations set the backdrop for 
the 1918 flu, which killed thousands of Floridians and hundreds of citizens in Jacksonville, where 
racism exacerbated underdevelopment. The flu was first recognized in Pensacola among military 
personnel on September 11, 1918, alongside other Atlantic coast cities.126 By late September, it 
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was recognizable statewide. On September 23, Phil Armstrang (possibly Armstrong) of 
Jacksonville’s Florida Times-Union referred to the flu as “the latest fad” in the Lakeland Evening 
Telegram.127 Floridians battled diseases absent from the rest of the country by 1918, and developed 
a cultural construct of disease from collective memory. Armstrang wrote that inaction caused 
Southerners to “kick the bucket” and “head a slow procession out to the cemetery and be all messed 
up among the flowers,” but Southerners had weathered lethal epidemics before: 
We’ll just bet grandma could handle this here Spanish Influenza. She could cure anything 
most that ailed you when you were a lad… In them good old days most every family was 
its own physician out there in the backwoods. Had to be. The old folks had to know how 
to cure anything from stumick ache to yaller jandice and believe us they did. 
We seldom saw a doctor and when one did ride out that away with his old fashioned saddle 
bags and his big white bottles of calomel and quinine it was an epoch in history, we tell 
you. People crowded around him like he was a man who had been to Paris. We couldn’t 
always tell whether he was a doctor or a preacher or a peddler. They all looked pretty much 
the same in those days… 
Maybe it’s the new name that scares us. Still it’s nothing to be sneezed at. In the old 
prohibitionless days when a man felt the first symptoms of grippe approaching he took 
quinine and put a jug of firewater under the side of his bed and went to it. When the quinine 
gave out there was still the booze and when that gave out there was more where it came 
from. So long as your money or credit held out you could hold out… 
We have had sever colds… and never minded it a-tall. We have had sever colds in the head 
most every winter since we can remember, in fact if we went through a winter without a 
cold keeping us sniffing we would get mad and swear a great swear because we would feel 
that we had been cheated out of the rights guaranteed us under the Constitution of the 
United States of America. It is because of that dod-gasted cold that always comes… and 
as soon as we feel the first attack we just say ‘Welcome, little stranger, come right in and 
have a seat in the parlor and don’t slam the door’… But this here Spanish Influenza is 
something else again… Wonder what we will have next year?128 
 
In 1888 and 1918, Jacksonville and the South possessed their own ways of grappling with disease 
after decades of experience, however ineffective. In one sense, modern medical capabilities and 
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physicians were saviors deserving of praise. In another sense, however, Southerners were isolated 
and sick, forced to fend for themselves. Medicine was beneficial only if it was accessible, and 
Armstrang thought that Southerners would do more with less as they always had. Southerners 
understood that their region of the country faced disease differently than communities elsewhere. 
Within days of Armstrang’s article, Floridians resorted to unorthodox treatments. One 
remedy proposed the treatment of children with “syrup of figs.”129 Authorities scrambled while 
the University of Florida repurposed its chapel into a makeshift hospital, after Gainesville’s local 
hospital was “able to handle only seven men.”130 News from Nashville reached Jacksonville on 
September 30, informing Floridians of cases in a town outside the city named Old Hickory, where 
the E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Company installed a powder plant for the war effort.131 Dr. William 
W. MacDonell, Jacksonville’s health officer, advised residents against crowds, and wrote that: 
If you are taken down with the disease go to bed and stay there – you are a menace to others 
if you are about… Jacksonville has given fifty-five physicians to the government services. 
Our nurses also have practically volunteered. Our hospital facilities are limited. Conserve 
our remaining doctors and nurses… Avoid crowds and if you cough or sneeze cover the 
cough or sneeze with your handkerchief. Don’t spit.132 
 
 
Floridians relied on non-pharmaceutical methods like social distancing alongside patent medicines 
and unconventional healing methods. They cooked their own cough remedies to “save about $2” 
if one retrieved “22
1 ounces of Pinex,” and mixed it with granulated sugar syrup, molasses, honey, 
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or corn syrup in a pint bottle, resulting in cough syrup besting one bought “for three times the 
money.”133 MacDonell knew that Jacksonville’s flu exposed the extent of his municipal and 
medical capabilities, remarking that there would be many facing the pandemic without a 
physician’s care. Firstly, there were not many physicians in practice under the best of conditions. 
Secondly, the war stripped Jacksonville and the South of its already limited number of physicians 
and nurses. Thirdly, those physicians fighting the flu were contracting the virus and dying. 
MacDonell wrote that, for “those who can’t get a doctor,” sufferers should rely on “castor oil and 
the use of aspirin in five grain tablets every three or four hours” for adults.134 
While Jacksonville’s hospitals were overrun with patients, services suffered. W. S. Henley, 
the acting district manager of the Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company wrote that their 
Jacksonville office lost fifty-five employees, inhibiting “prompt and efficient service” unless 
subscribers used telephones sparingly and experienced telephone operators volunteered for 
duty.135 Within twenty-four hours, Henley’s employee losses jumped from sixty-four to eighty-
three out of 191 telephone operators, who were either ill or dead.136 It appeared to Henley there 
was “no effort made” to minimize telephone use, and he lamented that “we can not handle the 
situation.”137 The next day, ninety-five of Henley’s 191 operators were gone. He reminded readers 
that “as a matter of public safety” it was “impracticable” to secure trained operators, and that, with 
the few survivors remaining, “business or social calls MUST BE ELIMINATED.”138 Authorities 
could not reach everyone. By October 8, the city’s epidemic was so severe that hundreds were 
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“without care of any kind.”139 Requests for Red Cross volunteers were left unanswered.140 The 
Jacksonville Traction Company suffered manpower loss enough suspend services indefinitely, 
because the flu had stricken “over half our trainmen.”141 On October 10, Floridians read about the 
flu turning New Orleans into a ghost town, as public places were shuttered by city orders and 
downtown street lights were left unlit to discourage gatherings.142  
Soup kitchens opened throughout the city under the command of Mrs. MacDonell, the city 
health officer’s wife, for families that had lost cooking adults, leaving the young and elderly 
without access to hot meals. The Union Congregational Church requested that those unable to 
reach the church call to receive soup. African Americans would only receive soup if they called 
ahead, whether they could reach the church or not.143 The kitchens provided “nourishing broths 
and soups” to over a hundred infected families, but somehow, the kitchens “for negro people could 
not supply the demand,” and African-American sufferers had to return after using a telephone to 
contact the reverend and receiving a card from Mrs. MacDonell at the city health office.144 While 
Camp Johnston volunteers provided soup to 5,709 white and 11,084 African American sufferers 
over twelve days, other institutions found ways to racially segregate Jacksonville’s sick.145 Other 
cities responded similarly to the pandemic in African-American communities. As conditions 
worsened, Floridians were advised to “go to bed and stay quiet – take a laxative” like black 
draught, because “nature is the ‘cure.’”146 One remedy proposed the use of a poultice by dicing six 
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to eight onions to mix with rye meal and vinegar to “form a thick paste” that was then placed in a 
cotton bag and applied to the chest “as hot as patient can bear.”147 These Southern treatments were 
solutions readily available where professional care was inaccessible. Patent medicine 
advertisements pretended to be official health advisories.148 Until the epidemic’s subsidence, these 
methods, like snorting Eucapine from eucalypti, appeared in regular reading.149 
 On October 12, authorities suspended church services.150 Locals disapproved. One 
Floridian argued that when church healing powers were most needed they would be suspended, 
thus asserting that the government thought worship was dangerous. He asked MacDonell “is it to 
be supposed that the prayers” for victory “ in the war will be more successful than the prayers in 
the churches for freedom from influenza?”151 Some identified influenza’s etiology as a 
combination of “fear, ignorance or sin”: 
In an epidemic more people are killed by fear than by disease. A state of fear invites 
disease. Anxiety and worry procure it and fear opens the consciousness so that it comes in 
and possesses the victim, till the last farthing is paid… Even man may aid in the abatement 
of an epidemic by calm reliance on God, by refusing to talk or think about sickness or 
death… In an epidemic the man who has no fear and relies upon the presence and power 
of God to protect him is very nearly immune to disease… It will… be understood that evil 
thinking, combined with fear, will create germs and microbes, and that the safest and surest 
cure “for this pestilence that walketh in darkness” is to let that Mind be in you which was 
also in Christ Jesus. For in that mind there is neither fear nor disease.152 
 
But that Christian spirit was thin enough to ensure that racial stratification remained intact, even 
if the flu warranted Christianly healing. The Union Congregational Church provided that case. 
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And in the Times-Union, white deaths were listed first and less frequently, while black deaths were 
listed last and more frequently.153 Even death registers were segregated. 
 By October 21, the flu began subsiding.154 Among celebrations was a new event “to be 
known in history as a flu banquet,” organized by quarantined Camp Johnston soldiers.155 Within 
the quarantine, soldiers arranged a feast, music by an infantry band, and décor that reminded them 
of home. According to the Times-Union, the flu banquet was a tremendous success, emblematic 
of a resourceful and perseverant American spirit. But the flu banquet’s comedy section was 
performed by the “Darktown Trio from Nowhere,” who made their:  
Debut amid a howl of laughter as the three colored men attired in fatigue clothes ambled 
down the aisle. Each was a champion in his line. One appeared to have been brought up 
among pianos, the keys seeming to know their master... Happy could have moved his dark 
skinned legs to the tune of a jig all evening had time permitted, and his specialty of a snake-
chased n***** brought a scream at every execution. Old Mose hobbled for all he was 
worth, and when his turn came spilled a veritable ocean of jokes in a typical negro way.156 
 
The company’s commanding officer then proposed “a silent toast” to the men who had died to the 
flu, and every soldier arose, concluding the evening by proudly singing the national anthem.157  
 By November, the state health board addressed Florida’s death toll, and the health officers 
who kept their districts together against impossible odds.158 Dr. John Keely, Jacksonville’s district 
health officer, wrote that while all his energy had been dedicated to the flu that year, it was:  
Unnecessary to dwell upon the numerical inadequacy of the practicing physicians 
throughout our State... It is also unnecessary to speak of conditions… in one locality as 
being better or worse than in another for they were bad enough everywhere, but surely the 
limit had been reached at ''Hawthorn," when you (Mr. Health Officer) and myself were 
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called there to assist the one local physician in covering an area of some thirty miles and 
in treating over one hundred and fifty patients, among whom were twenty-eight widely 
scattered pneumonia cases and all infected with a most virulent organism and many in a 
dying condition.159 
 
Jacksonville’s underdevelopment and race relations caused higher African-American mortality 
rates than historians previously thought. Armstrang distinguished Southern from “American” 
medicine, indicating that Southern epidemiology was closer to the developing world than the rest 
of the U.S. Race relations illuminated the extent of that distinction, elucidated through soup 
kitchens and military flu banquets. While Jacksonville fared better than other Southern cities, its 
example of Southern distinction shows that even if its mortality did not compare to Nashville or 
New Orleans, it suffered the same political and socioeconomic woes prevalent in the South. 
In 1981, William M. Straight tabulated Floridian pandemic mortality, and concluded that 
whites died more than African Americans, and that African Americans experienced the March 
wave, developing immunity to the September wave:160 
Figure 1: Straight’s FL State Mortality Data and Processed Data 
  Straight’s Raw Data             Processed Mortality Data 
Deaths: Total Male Female   Pop. Size161       Mortality Rate 
Total:  4114 2323 1791               967,640     4.2 per 1,000 
White:  2378 1434 944               638,153     3.7 per 1,000 
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Whites certainly died more than African Americans in raw numbers, but a reinterpretation using 
mortality rates proportional to race-respective population sizes show that the African-American 
mortality rate was 1.5 times the white rate. While more whites died numerically, African 
Americans had higher incidences of death relative to their population size.  
Straight’s presupposition was predicated on raw state health board data from 1918. In total, 
the board concluded that 4,114 Floridians were killed in the pandemic: eighty-five in September, 
2,712 in October, 934 in November, and 383 in December.162 There was a logical flaw in Straight’s 
assessment. He believed that African Americans died less than whites because they were conferred 
immunity in March, but he assumed this based on data only collected in the pandemic’s second 
wave, between September and December. The board never recorded spring mortality, but they did 
record autumn mortality. That data indicated that African Americans died in higher proportions in 
seventy-six percent of Florida counties in that second wave. There were fifty-four counties in 1918 
compared to the sixty-seven in 2019, and only in thirteen of them did whites have higher mortality 
rates. In most counties, black mortality rates were double the white rates, while in some, like 
Osceola County, the black mortality rate almost quintupled the white rate. A full list of processed 
Floridian county mortality statistics can be found in Appendix 1.  
There are also temporal implications. Second-wave mortality rates fluctuated from 
September to December. Figure 2 is arranged to reflect the evolving situation by pairing raw 
mortality numbers to computed mortality rates in parentheses, per 1,000 persons:  
Figure 2: FL State Mortality from September to December 
Pop. Size  September October November December Total  
Total: 967,640 85 (0.087) 2712 (2.8) 934 (0.96) 383 (0.39) 4114 (4.2) 
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White: 638,153 48 (0.07) 1592 (2.4) 507 (0.7) 231 (0.3) 2378 (3.7) 
Black: 329,487 37 (0.1) 1120 (3.3) 427 (1.2) 152 (0.4) 1736 (5.2) 
 
 
In September, African Americans faced mortality comparable to whites. By October, African 
American mortality increased, then lingered longer among African Americans than whites in 
November and December. The flu was undoubtedly more impactful among African Americans.  
Similar outcomes were observable for Jacksonville. T. Frederick Davis wrote that while 
the 427 deaths in the 1888 yellow fever epidemic occurred over four months, the 464 deaths in 
1918 occurred within four weeks.163 These were not all the deaths in Duval County. The health 
board recorded 859 total county deaths, including Jacksonville. 395 county deaths occurred outside 
the city, in isolation and rurality. The county suffered the highest mortality of Floridian counties. 
Its statistics are the best source for addressing Jacksonville’s flu, considering the health board only 
documented county-level mortality. African Americans died at a rate slightly higher than whites, 
although these statistics do not specifically reflect the mortality of poor whites: 
Figure 3: Duval County Pop. Size and Mortality 
 Pop. Size164   Raw Deaths165  Mortality Rate 
 Total: 113,540   859    7.5 per 1,000 
 White: 65,453   472     7.2 per 1,000 
 Black: 47,989   387    8.0 per 1,000 
 
 
Black mortality rates remained slightly higher than white rates until November and December. As 
highlighted in Figure 4, the flu persisted among African Americans compared to whites: 
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Figure 4: Duval County Mortality from September to December 
Pop. Size  September October November December Total 
Total: 113,540  26 (0.2) 736 (6.4) 58 (0.5) 39 (0.3)  859 (7.5) 
White: 65,453  12 (0.1) 421 (6.4)  26 (0.3) 13 (0.1)  472 (7.2) 
Black: 47,989  14 (0.2) 315 (6.5) 32 (0.6) 26 (0.5)  387 (8.0) 
 
 
Jacksonville’s mortality did not compare to many urbanized Northern cities. Still, its experience 
exemplified Southern conditions in cities that faced extraordinary mortality rates compared to 
cities nationwide. As expressed in the introduction to this study, the central limitation to the data 
tabulated in Figures 1 through 4 was the absence of an identifiable dataset for poor whites. The 
state health board grouped poor whites with the broadly-defined “white” demographic. The exact 
impact of the flu on impoverished white Floridians was impossible to address because no specified 
dataset existed on their mortality in the board’s official report. Poor whites were included in the 
board’s assessment of white mortality, but exactly how many remained unknown. Their experience 
may have been comparable to those of impoverished African Americans.  
Historians of Florida, like Straight and Davis, drew upon nineteenth-century memories and 
recalled 1888 when facing 1918. Davis wrote that “the rattle of the death carts of 1888” were 
“supplanted by the whir of the motor in 1918, as the trucks took their loads away.”166 The Southern 
collective memory of disease reappeared. While Northern cities faced diseases like cholera and 
typhus, Southern cities faced those same diseases and the illnesses connected to Southern ecology. 
Jacksonville’s experience was less grueling than other American cities, although it was the worst 
affected city in Florida. Poverty, underdevelopment, racism, and a reliance on the collective 
memory of Southern epidemics persisted throughout the pandemic, shaping the course of the flu 
through the city and warping the historiographical consensus thereafter.  
 




       Chapter Two: Infection, Indifference, and Walter Dodd in New Orleans 
New Orleans faced the worst flu mortality rate in the South in 1918, amplified by poverty, 
underdevelopment, and epidemiological racism in both thought and practice. Political indifference 
and public health paralysis contributed to that mortality, which preceded 1918 and continued after 
it. Late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century bouts with yellow fever epitomized New Orleanian 
public health before 1918. New Orleans was recognized for diseases like yellow fever and race 
relations stemming from slavery early in its history.167 African ethnic groups like black Creoles 
and African Americans unified during Reconstruction for political goals even when they lived in 
separate neighborhoods under different social and cultural institutions.168 Ethnic differences 
contributed to immunological assumptions distinct from other Southern cities facing yellow fever. 
While physicians used immunity to separate white and black bodies, it also separated Creoles and 
African Americans. Nineteenth-century Creoles boasted their reputed immunity to yellow fever, 
while African-American immunity caused stigma.169 Yellow fever struck the city thirty-nine times 
before 1906, contributing to its reputation for disease. These epidemics ended with urbanization 
and projects like sewer construction in 1904, with a final outbreak in 1905.170 
Still, poverty and underdevelopment defined the course of New Orleanian diseases. Like 
Savannah’s Black Beard Island quarantine station, New Orleans was equipped with its own station 
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at the mouth of the Mississippi River, where officials inspected ships and passengers to combat 
yellow fever.171 The 800-acre station was ninety miles from the city, without convenient rail 
access.172 In 1914, station officer Dr. G. H. Corput wrote that the attendant’s quarters and kitchen 
were overcrowded and unsanitary, while the laboratory harbored rats underneath its floorboards.173 
The station’s dynamo, carpentry, and machine shops required repairs, and Corput requested these 
upgrades from the USPHS and the city government.174 The station was isolated and uncared for, 
and Corput requested at least the tools for station personnel to conduct onsite repairs. Federal, 
state, and local indifference contributed to the station’s conditions, but New Orleans relied on the 
station’s success more than other cities further up the Mississippi River. New Orleans would be 
the first city struck with an epidemic entering through the Gulf of Mexico, and the unique disease 
ecology of the South posed a constant threat not faced in Northern cities.  
At the station hospital, floors were rotting, and the two wharves that provided marine 
access were either destroyed or had fallen into disrepair and been abandoned.175 They were 
stranded. Corput wrote that without attention the wharves would cripple station performance, and 
requested it be rebuilt with more funding. He anticipated “the big one.” He wrote that if his station 
received assistance, his personnel could enforce quarantines and protect cities up the Mississippi 
River, but if they were forgotten, they would “be hopelessly swamped and unable to handle the 
situation” should an emergency arise, especially with the Panama Canal’s opening, ensuring they 
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would soon be “undoubtedly confronted with such a contingency.”176 Without help, they would be 
unable to protect New Orleans and every population center along the Mississippi River dependent 
on gulf shipping. If they failed, yellow fever and other contagions would spread along one of the 
nation’s most critical economic veins, but they were left on their own. The station’s conditions 
were representative of federal indifference and Southern underdevelopment, before 1918.  
The language of Southern public health was both benign and malignant depending on its 
context and direction: public advisories emphasized family health preservation and civic duty in 
health guardianship, while medical texts tied color to contagion. To physicians, epidemiological 
problems were racial problems. Popular rhetoric was representative of the consensus on a region 
wrought with penury and disease, while medical literature clarified the role race played in shaping 
disease control. The discourse between both mediums of medical thought are representative of the 
South’s two-fold flu experience. Vitriolic conversations in circles of medical authority crafted the 
chimeric race-disease link that continued into and beyond 1918.  
Health advisories reflected this distinction. Fifteen rules published in the state health 
board’s 1918 almanac advised New Orleanians to focus on posture, clean eating, and cheerfulness 
as “rules of right living” that did not include reliance on social services or medical care.177 The 
almanac connected rage with disease, warning against contagious anger that tore through 
households, curable with a physician’s appointment eliminating “disagreeable outbursts.”178 
Medical progressivism was characterized by faith in health to correct societal ills, but access was 
limited in the South. Southerners accepted scientific solutions to their epidemiological problems 
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but were without access to quality medical care. De jure segregation further limited African 
Americans, and at hospitals and clinics where they were not forbidden, they often received care of 
lesser quality. Still, scientific language penetrated discourse. The almanac identified the “enemies 
of children” as doctors who failed to report disease cases, dirty milkmen, flies, teachers who closed 
classroom windows, “tuberculous cows,” parents who believed in natural inoculation, quarantine 
violators, and “dirty homes.”179 The board also asked residents to consider whether or not they 
wanted “to get sick” and lose their pay or jobs, while exposing their children to contagions.180  
Disproportionate black mortality shaped Southern epidemiological assumptions. In April 
1918, city health officer Dr. W. H. Robin proudly announced a favorable white mortality rate, 
made more apparent “were the colored population segregated,” considering African-American 
mortality was double white mortality with a population less than one-third the white population.181 
On May 8, he announced a survey to be conducted by Walter L. Dodd of the Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Company. The study was expected to prove “a considerable difference” between 
segregated white and black mortality rates and segregated sanitary conditions, which was 
anticipated to improve city image.182 Robin was confident Dodd would prove the board’s case.  
Dodd completed his report in May 1918, four months before the September flu wave. By 
1910, less than half of the city population was employed. One fourth of the employed were African 
American, and half of that were African American women.183 Dodd described the typical double 
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frame cottage of lavish upper-class American, French, Irish and German housing, and compared 
it to African American living standards. Persons of color, particularly Creoles, dwelled in small 
brick shanties, some once used as slave quarters, built in rows and scattered throughout the city, 
outfitted with a room, window, and door arrangement “comparable to a tier of cells.”184 New 
Orleanian housing codes were worthless. Like Brunner in Savannah, Dodd wrote that housing laws 
for African Americans needed revision to prevent the construction of shanties.185  
 Dodd connected health and poverty as well, linking city epidemiological problems to 
medical charity conditions. Physicians were paid poorly, and their “mediocre skill and inferior 
medicine,” Dodd wrote, did not “favor the patient’s recovery.”186 Hospitals like Charity Hospital 
and the Eye, Ear, Nose and Throat Hospital provided care for the indigent, segregated between 
1,400 white beds and only 400 African American beds.187 This was not the sufferers’ fault. Dodd 
wrote that the city’s per capita expense for health protection was thirty-six cents a citizen, while 
most cities relied on seventy-five cents for a mediocre health department.188 Dodd made his 
recommendations. Robin’s health department had no public health nurses, three part-time 
physicians, and fifty-seven sanitary inspectors, only fifteen of whom were fighting disease; the 
department needed more full-time physicians and at least one “trained in epidemiological 
investigations,” and an annual budget not less than $200,000, setting per capita costs “slightly over 
50 cents.”189 Dodd found the city’s abysmal epidemiological situation unsurprising. 
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While he conducted his investigation, the health department’s monthly two-page report 
lauded “public improvements” like city park growth and paved streets, making New Orleans “the 
winter capital of America.”190 The city offered “to the white home-seeker” a life quality and 
expectancy equal to “most favored large cities of the world,” and celebrated an improved annual 
mortality: a white mortality rate of 13.57 and African-American rate of 26.63 in 1917.191 
Authorities were inviting to “white home-seekers,” who congratulated themselves for declining 
white mortality and high African American mortality, confirming their hegemony. 
 Dodd was suspicious of their promises. New Orleans had fewer whooping cough deaths 
than other cities. However, whooping cough mortality was over one-third higher for African 
Americans than whites, even though department case reports were peculiarly lower for African 
Americans than whites. Dodd wrote that either whooping cough exacted incredible lethality on 
persons of color compared to whites, or, what was “much more probable” was that case reporting 
for African Americans was poor, as their deaths composed half the reported cases.192 Diphtheria 
was similar. While the diphtheria death rate was low, whites had higher morbidity rates, while 
African Americans had higher mortality rates. The difference, Dodd explained, was better white 
case reporting, and the “less prompt antitoxin treatment” for African-American children.193 
Typhoid was similar: a white mortality rate of 18.1 and African-American rate of 30.1 between 
1911 and 1916, worsened due to faulty case reporting “more marked among the colored.”194 
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However, as in other cities, mortality reporting was limited in totally addressing white mortality, 
as the reports did not differentiate between insulated whites and impoverished whites. 
 New Orleans suffered heightened TB activity compared to other Southern cities, with triple 
the African-American mortality rate over white mortality. Per 100,000 persons between 1911 and 
1916, white mortality was 176.4 while African Americans, without a preventive TB program of 
their own, recorded a mortality rate of 565.3.195 Dodd ascribed TB mortality to city-wide poverty, 
inaccessible medical care, malnutrition, and poor housing. Stagnant wages and a rising cost of 
living meant that most New Orleanians would not seek medical attention for TB. He studied 917 
death certificates from TB victims, and found that one fourth died without medical attention, with 
coroner signatures indicating that victims were “found dead in the house” or had “died of 
hemorrhage in street.”196 Citizens were not only unable to pay for treatment, but had to continue 
working to survive, hastening the disease’s course. Charity hospitals could help such individuals, 
but Dodd recognized that if they could not pay for a physician, they probably could not afford “to 
lose the day’s wages,” and there were no night clinics to visit after working hours.197 
Dodd was also agitated by the extent of malnutrition. He remembered watching for hours 
on Christmas morning as “thousands of poor children” filed by in a “never-ending line” to receive 
gifts from local businesses – a parade with few healthy bodies.198 Dodd’s assessment of the city’s 
housing conditions continued to be a benchmark for his assumptions about New Orleanian health. 
He wrote that African Americans lived in “converted warehouses” where the only ventilation 
sources were “a wooden door and wooden shuttered windows,” and in the inner city, many rooms 
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had no windows at all. To keep warm during winter, Dodd wrote that “battered windows are pulled 
tight and stuffed with rags,” turning the room pitch black; he remarked “Is it any wonder that 
tuberculosis is high with the negro?”199 He was frustrated with municipal TB control, writing 
pointedly that his comments on government activities against TB would “occupy but little space” 
in his report, because there was no program or campaign in place at all.200 
The hospital system was also ineffective. Most TB patients at Charity Hospital were 
homeless, remaining at the hospital until death.201 Some treatment was provided by the Louisiana 
Anti-Tuberculosis League, but Dodd doubted their performance as well. The League was designed 
in 1906 as a state association to support Louisiana hospitals and Charity Hospital in fighting TB.202 
In 1908, it opened its central TB sanatorium for incipient cases, Camp Hygeia, two hours from 
New Orleans without onsite physicians and prohibited to African Americans.203 Only twenty-nine 
of 500 reported cases in 1918 were African American, despite the city’s TB problem being 
“centered about the negro.”204 The League’s dispensary had no laboratory, and even though the 
board offered to examine sputum samples in 1917, the number of samples were only half the 
reported League cases that year. This indicated to Dodd that the League was not examining 
samples regularly, and that African-American TB cases were grossly underreported.205 For the 
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League to fight TB and support Charity Hospital, Dodd recommended that the League lift Camp 
Hygeia’s prohibition against persons of color and make provisions “for negro patients.”206 
 Dodd’s report identified the connections between disease, poverty and defective public 
health, linking cyclical destitution, insalubrious living conditions, and indifferent municipal 
leadership with city epidemiological woes. To Dodd, this was partly due to Reconstruction-era 
negligence and isolation, but he went further, recognizing city pathogenic problems as tethered to 
racism, but not as racial problems themselves as other investigators believed. He connected high 
African-American mortality to Jim Crow social architecture, rather than arguing the 
immunological fragility-hardiness paradox molded by racist interpretations of epidemiological 
data. The conditions Dodd outlined within weeks of the flu’s second wave were conducive to high 
African-American flu mortality, and are integral to understanding the New Orleanian response.  
“Nature is Not Mocked. She Demands ‘Pay’ Always”: The Flu in the ‘Crescent City’ 
Although New Orleans’s flu mortality rate was the third highest nationwide, Robin 
believed the city’s epidemic presented an opportunity to test faith in “modern science and 
sanitation.”207 He wanted to convince skeptics that the city was competitive with other cities in 
safety and life expectancy, and that the fight against the flu demonstrated global confidence in the 
city’s health. He wrote that the city’s mortality rate was commensurate to others, and that African-
American mortality rate had reached a new low, although it was still double the white rate.208  
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But Robin’s assessment was not true. The board reported 53,791 total flu cases between 
October 1918 and January 1919, with 3,511 deaths from the flu and associated pneumonias.209 
They also explicitly reported 1,158 white and 460 African-American flu deaths between October 
and December 1918, contributing to 1,618 of the year’s 1,752 defined overall flu deaths.210 In raw 
numbers, whites died more than African Americans, although African Americans possessed 
historically higher mortality rates. In 1918, persons of color still faced higher mortality rates: 
Figure 5: New Orleanian Mortality Rates per 1,000 for October 1917 and 1918 
Annual Avg. Rate Oct. 1918 Rate Oct. 1917 Rate 1918 Pop. 
White:          18.54        59.27       12.17    283,000 
Black:          31.59        88.96       23.41  106,000 
 
The combined death rate in 1918 per 1,000, excluding non-residents, was 22.09, but for October, 
death rates were 59.27 for whites from an 18.54 annual average, and 88.96 for African Americans 
from a 31.58 annual average, culminating in a total rate of 67.31 from the total population.211 This 
contrasted October 1917’s death rates (12.17 for whites and 23.41 for African Americans, with a 
total rate of 15.21).212 For explicitly-defined flu deaths from October to December, white mortality 
was 4.09 per 1,000 (
1,158
283,000




∙ 103 = 4.34). These rates appear similar, but consider the morbidity and mortality 
misreporting, or absence of reporting, highlighted months earlier in Dodd’s report. African-
American mortality skyrocketed to 88.96 per 1,000 from the 1918 average of 31.58 and 
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September’s 19.50, as city-wide mortality increased in October due to the pandemic.213 The 
misreporting that Dodd illuminated manifested in late 1918. Official statistics only include explicit 
flu deaths, creating the illusion that mortality rates between races were commensurate. But most 
African-American deaths from the virus were likely not reported as flu deaths, as Dodd indicated 
about other diseases months prior, and as city overall mortality rates outside defined flu cases 
illuminate. Poverty, segregation, inaccessible medical care, and inaccurate reporting inhibited the 
documentation of the exact toll of flu on the African-American community.  
 A reinterpretation of New Orleanian mortality between 1917 and 1918 revealed more about 
the relationship between race and mortality. These calculations rely on Figure 5’s data above: 
Figure 6: Estimated Dead for October 1917 and 1918 (Death Rate ∙ Population) 




 ∙ 283,000 = 16773 
12.17
1,000




 ∙ 106,000 = 9430 
23.41
1,000
 ∙ 106,000 = 2482  9430 – 2482 = 6948 
 
To calculate the approximate flu deaths in October 1918, subtract the number of October 1917 
deaths from the October 1918 deaths, since it was expected there would be a comparable number 
of deaths in any given October without epidemic disease affecting those numbers. Thus, the 
estimated flu death rates in October 1918 were 47.1 per 1,000 for whites (
13,329
283,000
∙ 103 = 47.1) and 
65.55 per 1,000 for African Americans (
6,948
106,000
∙ 103 = 65.55). With these numbers, it is possible 
to address how many times larger the October 1918 mortality rate was, compared to the October 
1917 mortality rate by dividing the October 1918’s death rate by October 1917’s death rate, 
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considering the population size for both years was relative. It is also possible to compare October 
1918 flu mortality rates with the average mortality rate for the year 1918 with a similar equation: 
Figure 7: October 1918 Flu Mortality Rates and Comparative Mortality Rates 
Oct. 1918 Rate/Oct. 1917 Rate Oct. 1918 Rate/Avg. 1918 Rate 
White:        
47.1
12.17
 = 3.87        
47.1
18.54
 = 2.54 
Black:        
65.55
23.41
 = 2.8        
65.55
31.58
 = 2.08 
 
Figures 5 through 7 reflect two aspects of New Orleanian flu mortality previously unexplored in 
the historiography and unapparent to health officers like Robin. From the recorded statistics, the 
African-American flu mortality rate of 65.55 per 1,000 was higher than it was for whites, who 
suffered a rate of 47.1 per 1000. The flu disproportionately killed African Americans in New 
Orleans. However, whites experienced higher overall loss at the pandemic’s peak in October than 
African Americans. In October 1917, families may have expected to lose one member compared 
to four people in white families and just under three for African-American families in October 
1918, dependent on family size. October’s high mortality was unusual among whites, but not as 
unusual among African Americans who faced high disease mortality rates before 1918. While 
African Americans suffered higher flu mortality rates that October, white mortality rates increased 
by a larger amount, perhaps contributing to the myth of a democratic pandemic. The amount of 
loss in white communities may have helped fuel the racism persons of color already faced in New 
Orleans, compounded by the effects of de jure segregation and the poverty downstream of it.  
New Orleans was as devastated compared to the rest of the nation as African-Americans 
were, compared to whites. It possessed one of the most highly-active ports in the country and had 




estimated population of 384,000, and 3,489 deaths from both influenza and pneumonia.214 One 
1930 report written by statistician Edgar Sydenstricker showed that, per 100,000 persons, New 
Orleans experienced a mortality rate of 709.3, topped only by Philadelphia (768.5) and Pittsburgh 
(1,008.7).215 Tabulation by the medical geographer Gerald F. Pyle showed similar results. Of an 
estimated population of 382,273, he noted between September 1918 and January 1919 a mortality 
rate of 24.0 per 1,000.216 To Pyle this was the fourth highest mortality rate across American cities, 
exceeded by San Francisco (25.8) and Philadelphia (27.7), and just above Pittsburgh (22.9).217 
New Orleans was struck hard by the flu because of its heavily trafficked port, abject poverty, 
powerless infrastructure, and thin public health provisions, compounded by racism and 
segregation. The various reports differ and were conducted over the twentieth century as new 
statistics became available. Some placed New Orleans ahead of Pittsburgh, while others showed 
that Pittsburgh suffered astronomically. But the various results concluded that New Orleans 
certainly featured in the top three cities for highest pandemic mortality rates nationwide.  
 The flu became a communal enemy after 1918. Virtuous language appeared in health 
almanacs due to post-war patriotism and a newfound connection between body and state. One 
advisory warned that poor health hindered the “highest development” of the individual and the 
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collective.218 Vaccination gained popularity, as New Orleanians marveled its capabilities in 
newspapers reporting the American empire’s disease control campaign in the Philippines.219 The 
1919 health almanac expanded the connection between individual and society in the war against 
disease. Advisories linked domestic space to disease in the community, neglecting the social, 
economic, and political conditions facilitating infection. Clean homes were the center of 
epidemiology, and New Orleanians were expected to arm themselves with fresh air, sunshine, 
sweeping, mopping, and dusting.220 This new war also required faith in health authorities. 
Progressive health policy favored science in cities with robust public health capabilities, but this 
was almost non-existent in the South. To fight a future flu pandemic, board members found they 
needed to eliminate “ignorance and unbelief” in flu transmission and distribution observations, 
and the “carelessness” of disobeyers.221 They promoted cooperation through poetry, using the flu 
as a benchmark. Take these two, for example, published in 1919: 
There was a man in our town, And he was wondrous wise.  
When Spanish “flu” first came along, It took him by surprise.  
But when he knew he had the “flu,” With all his might and main,  
Did what his doctor made him do, And soon was well again. 
Another man in our town, Was not so wondrous wise.  
He, too, fell victim to the “flu,” As you might realize.  
He followed faithfully each cure Suggested by each friend.  
A dozen methods brought him to A most untimely end.222 
 
 As along the street you trip, Do not spit! You’ll spread the grippe. 
 Here’s some good advice for you, Do not cough. You’ll spread the “flu”. 
 Do not sneeze! You base deceiver, Or you’ll spread catarrhal fever. 
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Southern health remained static. Authorities believed disease to be a threat more pressing than 
military conflict, excited about post-1918 national and international health. But instead of the flu, 
the board attacked venereal disease (VD), because it was wrongly attributed to African Americans, 
although it was prevalent among returning troops. The peril was given importance due to its moral 
assumptions. Authorities warned against “sowing ‘wild oats’” that would bring “crops of disease 
and suffering” over the community, cautioning that “nature is not mocked. She demands ‘pay’ 
always.”224 While health organizations dramatically expanded and reformed, New Orleanian 
health stagnated. Authorities remained indifferent to the evolving viral environment. 
The case of the Eye, Ear, Nose and Throat Hospital, which served the destitute, was 
emblematic of this ineptitude. The hospital staff turned to previous donors after the war, calling 
upon those “who so generously helped” in the past, but only three parishes donated a mere fifty 
dollars to the hospital.225 The hospital hoped the state would remember them and invite more 
donations, citing statistics that they had survived 1918 without one flu death. Admissions and cases 
did not increase during the pandemic, and there were no reported fatalities.226 But the hospital was 
struggling, requiring more funding and manpower to preserve its buildings.227 By 1920 Dr. Chas. 
Chassaignac of the hospital wrote that “our house is tumbling down upon us,” and “we must have 
a new hospital.”228 The hospital’s chief surgeon, Dr. R. C. Lynch, announced a “crying need” for 
new patient quarters, like other New Orleanian hospitals who held “little hope for immediate 
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improvement.”229 Municipal attention to medical facilities and health capabilities were nonexistent 
after the pandemic, and health concerns were still directed from outside institutions, like the 
Rockefeller Foundation, into the South, not from institutions within the South. 
Charity Hospital provides further evidence that the flu highlighted the need for more 
funding, training, and equipment. In 1919, the hospital’s vice president J. P. Henican reminded 
officials that his hospital required extensive upgrades to its mortuary, made apparent during the 
pandemic, when staff faced difficulty managing overwhelming numbers of corpses.230 
Government inattention created problems in how staff treated the sick. There were 409 African-
American and 662 white beds available in the hospital.231 The number of beds for either race were 
not enough to be effective in a pandemic. But Dodd’s documentation of the extent of disease in 
impoverished African-American communities, and the degree of care required to soothe their 
suffering suggests that 409 beds for black people were certainly not enough: 
Figure 8: Charity Hospital Statistics from September to December 1918 
Outdoor Clinic Cases:232             General Admissions:233           Deaths:234 
White  Black  White  Black  White  Black 
September:  1,277  1,235  893  618  78  57 
October: 682  807  1,227  643  222  136 
November: 835  857  763  411  106  62 
December: 861  971                  786  478  102  56 
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Total:  3,655  3,870  3,669  2,150  508  311 
It appears that whites fared worse than African Americans during the pandemic, but consider the 
admissions trend. There are almost two hundred fewer African-American deaths than white deaths, 
but while white outdoor clinic cases dropped at the pandemic’s height in October, white general 
admissions increased by several hundred patients. Meanwhile, as African-American outdoor clinic 
cases also dropped in October, their general admissions increased by only twenty-five. Neither 
whites nor African Americans sought assistance from hospitals in large numbers during the 
pandemic. For those who did, persons of color were mostly treated in outdoors on the hospital 
porches, while whites were treated inside the hospital itself. The hospital specifically identified 
1,181 white and 406 African-American flu patients, with 196 white and eighty-four African-
American deaths.235 The white CFR was 16.6 percent, while the black CFR was 20.7 percent. 
 The racial stratification and health conditions of New Orleans undoubtedly shaped the 
course of the flu through the city, contributing to the third highest mortality rate in the country. 
Like elsewhere in the U.S., hospitals were overburdened, and health systems collapsed. But in 
New Orleans, Southern social dimensions molded a different flu than the one experienced 
elsewhere. Squalid living conditions for the general population and certainly for persons of color, 
coupled with municipal indifference and lackadaisical public health measures, contributed to an 
environment conducive for high flu mortality. The negligence of authorities in African-American 
mortality reporting distorts a clear image of New Orleans’ flu, but even with documented figures, 
African Americans undeniably faced higher mortality rates than whites, increasing the city death 
toll that surpassed some of the largest and most populated cities in the U.S. 
 
235 “Report of Record Room – Year 1918,” Report of the Board of Administrators of the Charity Hospital to the 




         Chapter Three: Poverty, Pellagra, and the Flu Pandemic in Nashville 
The 1918 flu in Nashville was exacerbated by Southern penury and underdevelopment like 
in Jacksonville and New Orleans, identified in the epidemiological reporting of preceding years. 
Nashville’s flu experience was captured in personal testimonies, which ratified the grim conditions 
hinted at in official documentation. In the mid-nineteenth century, Nashville had the highest 
disease mortality rate in the U.S. due to its living conditions and inept public health.236 Cholera, 
and scarlet and yellow fevers posed epidemic threats while malaria lingered in wet weather and 
pellagra harassed the malnourished. Nashville was landlocked and still suffered epidemics familiar 
to Southern port cities. An 1895 report indicated there were 1,816 deaths in the city compared to 
the previous year’s 295, and white infant mortality decreased while African-American infant 
mortality increased.237 Whites suffered a mortality rate of 15.42 per 1,000 persons, while African 
Americans suffered a rate of 29.37 per 1,000. The chief killer was TB that year, which killed 300 
Nashvillians: eighty-two whites and 218 African Americans.238 Health officer Dr. N. G. Tucker 
argued for more resources for the city’s disease hospital, calling attention to the lack of patient 
accommodations. He anticipated a future emergency that would result “in a very serious dilemma,” 
but funding and manpower were limited.239 If diseases like malaria and yellow fever contributed 
to Southern distinction, so too did the inability of authorities to combat them. 
In 1898, Nashville’s new health officer, Dr. Larkin Smith, observed that of 1,601 deaths in 
1898, 797 were white and 804 were African American, while 68,942 whites and 41,892 African 
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Americans made up Nashville’s population of 110,834. Smith compared this racial dichotomy to 
other cities, with attention to the impact of African-American mortality on total city mortality.240 
High African-American mortality raised total mortality, although African-American mortality 
statistics were never defined in city promotional material. This was unacceptable to a health officer 
seeking to reduce mortality and make Nashville attractive. He wrote that high African-American 
mortality was due to “improvidence, ignorance, lamentable neglect of personal cleanliness,” and 
that “the negro” needed to “contend with his racial susceptibility” to disease.241  
While officials implicated black bodies and behavior for city epidemiology, government 
debates ensued about isolation hospitals. A 1912 report declared the city isolation hospital 
unreliable after it was constructed far from the city and “surrounded by backwaters,” severing 
access to impoverished sufferers.242 Officials proposed the erection of an isolation hospital within 
the city to be completed that year, but citizens were hesitant about an isolation hospital near their 
neighborhoods, and public health measures were useless on the impecunious, who were unable to 
“procure proper medical attention” and “afford suitable nursing.”243 These calls continued 
unheeded into 1914, when health officer Dr. W. E. Hibbett wrote that the state could not hope for 
“material benefits” in disease reduction until the hospital’s construction.244  
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 One disease shaping Nashvillian mortality was pellagra, which was exacerbated by 
Southern penury. In a 1916 Vanderbilt University report, pathologists James W. Lobling and 
William Petersen wrote that since 1914, pellagra inflicted severe economic and physical suffering, 
and that while before 1907 few physicians “knew its nature,” by 1916 there were thousands of city 
cases.245 Pellagra is a nutritional disorder caused by niacin (vitamin B3) deficiency, leading to 
dermatological and gastrointestinal complications. By World War II, niacin-infused flour 
practically eradicated it from developed countries.246 But in 1916, scientists were still learning 
about the disease. There were associations between pellagra and diet, but these were convoluted 
by climatological and racial observations. Lobling and Petersen were perplexed by its racial 
epidemiology. African Americans did not appear as susceptible as whites during cooler months. 
Fifty percent of their white patients developed pellagra in spring months compared to thirty percent 
of their African-American patients, while only forty-four percent of white patients developed 
pellagra in summer months compared to sixty-six percent of African-American patients. The data 
puzzled them. Most pathologists believed pellagra was “due to photodynamic substances,” but 
Lobling and Petersen considered that if such were true, African Americans, “because of their dark 
skin,” would require more sun exposure to get sick compared to whites.247 
 Lobling and Petersen noticed that all their patients consumed excess carbohydrates, an 
apparent Southern trend. Indigent patients ate corn, corn-bread, and grits, as well as sugar cane 
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molasses, turnip-tops, wild mustard, green onions and peas, and cheap apples and peaches.248 They 
were unconvinced that pellagra was totally a malady of the poor but recorded some connection. 
They considered water quality and residential privy conditions, finding that among their patients 
only two percent of houses had screens on windows, and that privies were proximal to kitchens. 
They discovered a difference in contact histories between whites and African Americans. 84.5% 
of white patients provided histories of their travels and contacts, compared to 57.9% of African-
American patients. The pathologists believed this was due to the “failure” of African Americans 
“to remember dates and addresses,” therefore providing porous contact histories, if any.249 They 
found that food prices and costs of living did not rise dramatically enough to produce pellagra 
outbreaks. Wages actually increased since 1911, and the only downturn in the city economy was 
due to World War I’s outbreak in 1914.250 They wrote that if pellagra was due to “dietary 
deficiency essential to poverty,” then deaths would be higher in unsewered areas, because those in 
the “’pellagra class’” would be financially unequipped to live in sewered parts of the city.251 
However, death rates seemed equal in areas with and without sewers. White and black 
susceptibility appeared equal aside from seasonality, but whites contracted the disease more 
frequently than African Americans while African Americans faced higher mortality rates than 
whites.252 This was unsurprising to the researchers, and they never inquired into why African 
Americans possessed higher death rates. They never compared Nashvillian socioeconomics to 
other cities as Dodd did in New Orleans in the summer of 1918. Perhaps they would have found 
what Dodd found: that Nashville was connected to Southern poverty, not exempt from it. 
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 Lobling and Petersen were unpersuaded that pellagra, a disease of poverty, was connected 
to Nashvillian destitution. Their report was emblematic of Nashville’s unresolved sociomedical 
problems heading into 1918. Their conclusions were not pointed against the poor, nor were they 
chimerically racist or classist, but their assumptions were clouded by the limitations of medical 
knowledge in which suppositions disregarding the disease-poverty dyad filled the void. They never 
denied that poverty was a factor, but did not find the correlation themselves, because poverty 
depended on where the impoverished lived. Their report provides insight into the socioeconomic 
conditions connected to disease morbidity and mortality, and the contours of prevailing medical 
thought. These features shaped the course of the flu through Nashville.  
Four Characters in Search of an Exit: The Flu Reaches ‘Music City’ 
In 1918, Nashville’s population of 120,000 swelled by 35,000 “desperately crowded 
immigrants” working at a powder plant in Old Hickory to 155,000.253 Old Hickory was a planned 
industrial community built in January 1918, erected in Davidson County but just outside of 
Nashville by the E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Company and the federal government to produce 
powder for the war.254 There, thousands from Nashville and elsewhere, including Mexico, 
clustered together for work. In 1978, John B. Thomison wrote there were 40,000 city flu cases 
between October 1 and November 15, 1918, of which 468 died, with a mortality rate of 3.0 per 
1,000.255 From newspaper headlines, he assumed Nashville’s flu was not as severe as elsewhere. 
But in 1986, Gerald F. Pyle updated Thomison’s work, and recalculated Nashville’s mortality rate 
as 21.6 per 1,000 persons between September 1918 and January 1919 – one of the highest mortality 
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rates in the U.S.256 By February 1919, there were 875 flu deaths, resulting in an excess death rate 
of 610 per 100,000, rendering Nashville’s mortality “one of the most severe in the country.”257  
Nashville’s flu was captured in official documents and newspapers as well as personal 
testimony. In August 1918, Henry Armistead Whitaker (1889-1937), a twenty-nine year old 
accountant from New York, was stationed at Camp Greenleaf, Ft. Oglethorpe, near Chattanooga,. 
From the camp he wrote regularly to his wife, Dorothy Rand Whitaker. Also serving at Ft. 
Oglethorpe was Reverend Elbert Leach Orr (1879-1941), a thirty-nine-year-old Nashvillian pastor 
and Army chaplain. He also wrote to his wife, Edna Elizabeth Stewart Orr (1884-1966), who wrote 
back when she could while parenting their two daughters. Meanwhile, twenty-three-year-old Lou 
Cretia Owen prepared for her journey to Old Hickory. She was hired as a welfare worker at the 
DuPont plant, with an October 1 starting date.258 The experiences of Whitaker, the Orrs, and Owen 
reflected the various perspectives of the pandemic and the collective experience of Southerners, 
who faced the flu with a fragile public health system, cyclical poverty, and citizen-government 
friction already precipitating an environment conducive to high mortality. 
On September 29, the flu reached epidemic proportions in Nashville, and infected Dr. 
Hibbett, the health officer who urged the isolation hospital’s construction in 1912. DuPont officials 
denied claims that the flu reached Old Hickory, dispelling rumors circulating days before Lou 
Cretia Owen’s first day of work.259 But the flu did reach Old Hickory, and the outbreak was 
expected to initiate a “crisis in Nashville within the week.”260 Authorities were aware of its 
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strength. On October 1, the virus encompassed the state, and officials, led by Hibbett and USPHS 
Captain R. C. Derivaux, convened that night to discuss strategy.261 Old Hickory’s DuPont plant 
was crucial to Nashville’s military and economic importance, and Derivaux visited the plant that 
day to assess the situation. A DuPont representative informed the Nashville Banner there was no 
need to panic, because the company had “adopted all possible precautionary measures.”262 But in 
the city, conditions deteriorated. The city hospital, headed by Dr. W. F. Fessey, filled with flu 
patients. Fessey told the Banner that hundreds sought admission to the hospital, but all physicians 
could do, given their limited resources, was “advise them as to home treatment and send them 
away.”263 Nashville was grappling with the weight of the global pandemic, crushed under regional 
penury and public health unpreparedness, connecting the South to the rest of the developing world. 
The day before, Henry Whitaker wrote to his wife from a Ft. Oglethorpe supply room. He 
heard there were flu cases in the camp, but did not ponder it much, and neither did his fellow 
soldiers. He hoped there would be no quarantine, and that the number of flu cases would 
decrease.264 But in twenty-four hours, the camp’s epidemiological conditions deteriorated, and the 
number of cases skyrocketed. Now, he expected a major quarantine of his company, as others had 
been.265 That night he attended a minstrel show, performed in black face, at the local Y.M.C.A. 
The performers advised troops sleeping in field tents to seal their tent flaps, because a soldier “left 
his open the other night, and in flew Enza.”266 That day, Owen opened her diary for the first time. 
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She was proud of her hiring, and ready to play her role among women workers in the war effort. 
On October 1, she started her new job, and never noticed the flu cases emerging around the plant.267 
On October 2, newspapers reported an “unprecedented condition” at Fessey’s hospital, 
where most patients, few of whom were African American, were “in critical condition and will 
die” because of limited accommodations, forcing physicians to turn down new patients.268 The 
virus’s pathological nature barely troubled officials compared to “hysteria bred from the germ of 
hyperbole.”269 They reassured Nashvillians that their share of the pandemic was no worse than 
elsewhere, but it was. It was distinct, and central to that distinction was Old Hickory.  
 On October 3, Owen opened her diary for its second entry. As in Ft. Oglethorpe, conditions 
deteriorated. The flu was “raging” at Old Hickory, and a visit to a makeshift hospital erected almost 
overnight revealed a nightmarish atmosphere “in the trail of the disease”: 
A dormitory has been opened for a hospital for women and girls. To this building each day 
patients stricken during the night are brought. A woman doctor stays in the building and a 
nurse visits each patient frequently. The problems of caring for the large number that have 
developed the disease is great. The chief matron is ill and only four members of the 
woman’s work staff are left to carry on the program…  
As I pass down the corridor at the hospital, I see a young girl a war bride, who repeats 
deliriously that she is married and begs to have her secret kept. In an adjoining room, a 
young girl pleads for relief. The nurse goes from room to room soothing the patients and 
superintends their treatment. She scarcely sleeps. I found the girl-bride’s marriage 
certificate of her wedding. She married a sailor and declares that he will not return to her 
if her marriage is announced. She pleads with us to keep the secret from her mother. The 
doctor says that she cannot recover and advises me to notify her mother of her condition. I 
cannot reach her parents at the address she gave. Probably it is not correct. This is one of 
the tragedies occurring here.270 
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These were not the conditions reflected by newspapers, DuPont officials, or the health authorities 
who visited Old Hickory two days earlier. To them, Old Hickory’s flu was more than manageable, 
but Owen’s diary reveals this was not the case. Either within forty-eight hours the virus underwent 
an amplification in ferocity, gathering strength among crowded African-American and immigrant 
workers because of the crowded, substandard living conditions, or conditions were wrapped with 
morale-preserving reassurance and mistruth.271 Foremost on the minds of most Americans was the 
war, and not the pandemic. Nashville’s authorities intended on keeping it that way.  
 On October 4, national advisories against gathering or coughing in crowds surfaced 
alongside advice unique to Southerners. Officials told Nashvillians they would find many 
attempting to flee the flu in vain, because “it is prevalent everywhere.”272 Memories of past 
epidemic refugees and exoduses from Southern cities resurfaced, like the 1888 yellow fever 
epidemic in Jacksonville. Southerners understood the practice of running from epidemics to 
climates and ecologies less conducive to pestilences like yellow fever and malaria, but never before 
had they faced an epidemic of this magnitude, which followed its victims wherever they went. 
Fleeing epidemics was and still is a universal phenomenon practiced worldwide throughout 
centuries to avoid plague, cholera, typhus, smallpox, and yellow fever. But in the early twentieth-
century U.S., the practice was absent in Northern cities as public health and urbanization expanded 
and eliminated the threat of malaria and yellow fever. The unique disease ecology of the South 
continued to harass Southerners and force them to flee northward, even after the century’s turn. 
 That day, Owen struggled to maintain morale in Old Hickory, where untrained and 
overworked personnel lacked the resources to treat infected employees. Thirty of her coworkers 
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were dead, and there was no protocol for corpses. “When the epidemic is over,” she wrote, “records 
will show that some were buried in the city’s burying ground and their graves will be unmarked 
and their bodies unclaimed.”273 As to the delirious bride, she found that death had: 
Claimed the young war-bride. We failed to communicate with her mother. Consequently 
another tragedy was added to the list and while somewhere a sailor dreams of his wife, she 
goes to a nameless grave. Her personal possessions were stored in the safety first office. 
The variety of articles stored in this office indicate the colorful drama that grips the plant. 
While looking through some things stored there today, we found unclaimed watches, 
assignment cards, rings, pins and jewelry that were valued for sentimental reasons. These 
possessions were taken from the deceased and are held for relatives to claim.274 
 
Amidst tragedy, Owen found meaning at Old Hickory, even as Derivaux swore conditions had 
improved.275 She remembered enrolling in a summer Y.M.C.A.-Red Cross course in Nashville 
entitled “Home Nursing and Care of the Sick,” and although she could not serve as a nurse 
overseas, she found purpose at Old Hickory, relying on her training to fight the most disastrous 
pandemic in modern history. American women were at the center of it. She wrote that “years will 
pass and memories of these glamorous days will fade,” requiring her to “keep a record of the part 
that women are taking” in the war and pandemic effort.276 For Owen, the flu simultaneously 
inflicted terror and provided opportunity. Department vacancies were being created by the flu, and 
the “executive ability” of women was “being demonstrated to a surprising extent. Women are 
taking an important place” in the plant’s fight against the flu – a woman’s fight.277 
 Still, the flu was damaging. On October 6, Owen wrote there were 4,000 women living on 
property and only four left to oversee their work, with their top supervisor ill. She and her 
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coworkers were “accustomed to hearing agonizing screams and pleas for relief” erupting from Old 
Hickory’s hospitals.278 Nashville’s conditions were equally Dantesque, as the city’s best medical 
teams were deployed to rural communities, leaving clinics shorthanded.279 Interviewed by the 
Tennessean, Dr. Olin West of the state health board contradicted Owen and Fessey’s accounts, 
promising Nashvillians that Old Hickory’s conditions had improved. He ridiculed what he felt 
were exaggerated reports, and praised Old Hickory’s physicians for handling the flu so smoothly 
that plant hospitals were “dismissing influenza patients faster than they are receiving new 
cases.”280 The board sought to calm a restless and sick Nashville.  
 Meanwhile at Ft. Oglethorpe, Whitaker wrote to his wife, squatting outside a supply house 
in the gutter, pretending to be resting from a volleyball game. He was shocked at the new 
quarantine camp’s size. Several days prior, he glanced upon troops erecting tents in the quarantine 
zone, but their gates hung open and there was minimal activity.281 Now, the quarantine extended 
across the camp, and it was flooded with men, a few from his company. He wrote from the gutter 
because one of the supply house men was coughing, so “until it is diagnosed,” he wrote, “yours 
truly is doing the exempt act as much as possible.”282 
  A day later in the same camp, Elbert Leach Orr was writing to Mrs. Orr back home in 
Nashville from Lookout Mountain, in Georgia. He was worried about conditions at the camp and 
his family. Mrs. Orr wrote him a letter informing him that their daughters had contracted the virus. 
Six-year old Katherine slept constantly while four-year old Victoria Louise was “sick enough to 
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be cranky,” becoming bedridden.283 She was thankful there were not many men at her husband’s 
camp, because troops were “dying by the dozens” in populated camps.284 He was aware of the 
threat. With his building shuttered and meetings suspended, he assisted another chaplain in the 
quarantine. “Poor, home-sick fellows,” he wrote of the quarantined soldiers, “they wanted stamps, 
paper, envelopes, letters written – everything.”285 He visited the infirmary, where personnel treated 
troops using saturated gauze placed over their airways, and planned to help at the hospital later 
that week, where the worst cases were. He worried about the soldiers. “How they touch your heart,” 
he wrote, “sick and homesick – one has to help them, or get away.”286 Whitaker was becoming 
one of those men. That morning, he felt unwell, and took pills to suppress infection. He knew what 
was coming. “Do not worry about me dear,” he wrote to his wife, “for it is not the influenza that 
is dangerous but the pneumonia that sometimes comes afterwards due to lack of care.”287  
In Old Hickory that night, Owen retired to her diary. The flu “overshadowed everything” 
at the plant, and everywhere she went there was federal presence, because the plant was “a 
government war project, located in the South and operated by Southern labor. It is in a way an 
experiment in industry here.”288 The flu attacked Old Hickory almost overnight before authorities 
could respond, infecting hundreds within days. Six temporary hospitals were erected when the 
main hospital was overrun, and the Y.M.C.A. building admitted the sick by turning its offices, 
gymnasium, and lobby into field hospitals filled with cots. Old Hickory’s women workers fought 
the flu directly. “Secretaries turned their attention to serving patients,” while others “acted as 
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chaplain to the dying,” and those issuing “cigars and candy across the counters now served soup 
and broth.”289 The hardened DuPont women epitomized the American spirit Owen was inspired 
by. “They are courageous,” she wrote, “and ready to face hardships if necessary.”290 Their 
experience suggested that federal response to the pandemic was no better than the local one.  
 Southern social dimensions remained intact. Mexican labor dominated the plant’s 
immigrant labor pool, separated in a village alongside African-American workers, and this 
segregation from white labor produced stratified medical care. Marginalized groups constructed 
makeshift hospitals from bunk houses in the Mexican section, and from the African-American 
Y.M.C.A. building. Scouts extracted African-American and Mexican sick from their quarters to 
the hospitals. Twenty-six physicians across Old Hickory’s white, black, and immigrant hospitals, 
supported by fifty from Nashville, were not enough “for patients to receive the care necessary”: 
Often they lie for hours in pain waiting for attention. Then… at one time, twenty-six 
doctors have been ill and there is never a time when all the doctors and nurses can attend 
to their duty. Serious cases are sent to the base hospital. When a case is taken there it is a 
sign that it is regarded serious. The patients do not know this and are glad to be transferred 
to the hospital. They are helpless and in the hands of the company officials.291 
 
Owen wrote that “negro doctors for the negro village” were outstanding, heightening the morale 
of the sick, who knew “that they are given care and will continue to get it.”292   
At Ft. Oglethorpe, Orr continued soothing the ailments of troops in the quarantine zone. 
He hoped his family would escape pneumonia. New cases emerged daily, and days before, he felt 
“a little cold,” although he slept well and had “fine appetite.”293 He observed the flu’s movement 
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via camp reports and found that it was expanding in major cities. He pleaded with Mrs. Orr to take 
care of herself and their daughters, looking forward to “normal life” – to him, the “greatest blessing 
of all – to stop killing the men.”294 He felt lingering flu symptoms, but kept busy by distributing 
magazines and writing letters, providing stamps, candy, and apples to troops, and transporting 
telegrams to families near the camp. Some quarantined soldiers were healing, while others 
approached him “bleeding like stuck-pigs.”295 He pondered his own susceptibility, and prayed he 
could “stay well and keep able to work among the fellows while I am here.”296 His family’s 
condition worried him, but the quarantine conditions consumed his time.  
 On October 10, West returned to the Banner in Nashville. Frustrated and determined to 
regain control of public sentiment, he reiterated that false Old Hickory flu reports continued to 
circulate to the war effort’s detriment. He alluded to an “organized effort” to “pervert the truth” 
and hinder government efforts in Nashville by “the sensational talebearer.”297 But another Banner 
article two days later referred to mortality as the heaviest since “the cholera epidemic swept the 
city.”298 They referred to the 1873 cholera epidemic that killed 4,000 of the city’s 27,000 citizens, 
drawing upon the city’s collective memory of disease even when citizens may not have 
experienced that epidemic themselves.299 One article that day entitled “Police Sergeant Acts 
Doctor and Saves Flu Victim” recounted the story of a Nashville police officer who stumbled upon 
a man in the street within the flu’s death-grip, incapable of admission to Fessey’s floundering 
hospital because he was “entirely without funds.”300 The officer took the man to a boarding house, 
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where his life was saved. In the South, playing “doctor” meant more than practicing healing 
methods. It meant having the resources to employ and receive care and survive. 
Whitaker wrote to his own wife that day. “Please excuse the scragglyness of this little note 
but it is dark here,” Whitaker wrote, “by here I mean quarantine.”301 He had contracted the virus. 
His handwriting and shortened letters reflected it. He was now one of the men Orr was fighting to 
save. Physicians anticipated his survival if they could defeat pneumonia. Within twenty-four hours 
he had pulled through a fever and bunked with other sick men from the supply house. He was weak 
and underfed, but glad he was alongside “plenty of friends” in the quarantine, if he had “sufficient 
energy to enjoy them.”302 In quarantine, men defeated the flu by living as they had, before surgical 
masks, cots, and mass graves. Whitaker and a friend decided to “make hot lemonade over a 
candle,” pillaging the quarantine kitchen and pestering men on the chance they could “scrape up a 
lemon.”303 They acquired sugar, water, and one lemon to split between them, boiling water with a 
candle before a friend entered their tent with a pitcher of hot lemonade. They swallowed both their 
fellow soldier’s pitcher of lemonade and their own candle-warmed lemonade, and battled fever 
together that same night.304 
Whitaker, the Orrs, and Owen were characters of larger Southern tensions illuminated by 
the pandemic: the citizen-government friction on health guardianship. In Jacksonville, Armstrang 
doubted modern medicine and what he felt was the myth of federal protection that connected 
Southerners. In New Orleans, Dodd was unsurprised with high mortality, especially among 
African Americans, considering living conditions, poverty, and municipal indifference. 
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Nashvillian sentiment manifested itself on the Tennessean’s front page, where frustrated citizens 
defined their line. On September 7, before the second wave of the pandemic arrived, the USPHS 
and city authorities enforced sanitary measures in domestic space, placing responsibility on the 
citizenry.305 Officials were trying to modernize Nashville’s health infrastructure by reinventing 
sewer systems and mandating privy construction. They especially wanted to safeguard Old 
Hickory’s health, with the DuPont plant a primary concern. Two weeks later the flu reached 
epidemic proportions. Residents felt that order mandating domestic privy construction was 
inadequate. It placed responsibility on citizens for cleanliness within domestic space, while 
lackadaisical officials contributed nothing to municipal space. Authorities struck down a resolution 
on October 10 that would repair Nashville’s street-flushing machines and resume sanitary 
measures in fighting the flu.306 The following day, an overwhelmed citizenry responded by 
demanding their representatives “flush the streets”: 
An outraged public demands the flushing of the downtown streets and sewers – AND 
THEY DEMAND IT NOW. Personal likes and dislikes, political moves to benefit political 
futures, must be cast aside. The cry today is for action. God pity the man who, in the midst 
of a scourge, can’t view things from other than a selfish standpoint. The Tennessean calls 
upon the City Commissioners to lay aside their differences – AND DO. This is not the time 
to discuss negligence or failure to perform duty, be it right or wrong. THE PUBLIC 
KNOWS THE STREETS OF NASHVILLE NEED FLUSHING, AND DEMAND THEY 
BE FLUSHED WITHOUT FURTHER QUIBBLING. 
The Tennessean is in receipt of a long communication from one of the commissioners, 
explaining and elucidating, asking that it be published. The Tennessean does not think the 
people of Nashville care a whoop at this time for explanations – but the Tennessean does 
know THAT THE PEOPLE OF NASHVILLE WANT THE FILTH AND 
ACCUMULATED DIRT OF SIX WEEKS STANDING cleared from the streets – and, 
once again, calls upon the City Commissioners to DO THEIR DUTY. FLUSH THE 
STREETS AND FLUSH THEM IMMEDIATELY.307 
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One day later, authorities promised to resume street flushing once apparatus was repaired, after 
discontinuing the practice for weeks.308 The flu is a respiratory virus, and is connected to crowded 
streets, not dirty ones. But the pandemic meant something different for Nashvillians angered at 
municipal indifference and the condition of city public health. The flu illuminated the need for 
effective health policy and sanitary procedure, not predicated on taxpaying citizens, but on the 
representatives, who promised to protect the citizenry if they were elected to seats of power. The 
virus highlighted the city’s porous infrastructure and inability of political actors to combat disease. 
Flushing the streets was not about beating back the flu. It was about ensuring the accountability of 
municipal agencies in protecting human health, in a region wrought with contagions. 
On October 13, Mrs. Orr wrote to her husband, still battling the flu. Friends and neighbors 
were dying all around her. One friend lost four sons in a US Army camp, and two more extended 
relatives. But Mrs. Orr’s daughters survived. They were now eating “like little pigs,” and their 
resilience inspired her to “get my appetite again and get fat one of these days.”309 While she ached 
“for the poor homesick lads away… and sick,” she was proud of her husband’s courage.310 He 
wrote back two days later, thankful they never developed pneumonia, as quarantine zone 
conditions worsened. The volume of death made it “impossible to take care of the corpses,” he 
wrote, as “hundreds have been stacked up in the morgue like so many butchered pigs.”311 His 
family was spared, but the quarantined men he had grown to love were not. Field exercises, the 
quarantine’s conductivity, cold nights, and cramped conditions took its toll outside the European 
battlespace. They both knew this virus was different that previous ones. On a train she stumbled 
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upon two children, “one of whom kept calling for her mother,” and learned that “her mother was 
in the baggage car and two weeks before, the father had been buried. Both died of influenza.”312 
Owen wrote little that week in Old Hickory. By October 16, she had contracted the flu. She 
concluded that entry early, resolute to “overcome the flu” and “determine[d] that it will not keep 
me down.”313 Two days later she was resting at home, in Nashville. Traveling through the city for 
the first time since working at the plant, she wrote that the city’s denizens:  
Scarcely realize that a war is raging in Europe or that a large industry is grinding out 
powder in Tennessee. Snug in their homes, they are free of the sacrifices made in other 
places. They fear contact with influenza patients and their world is a small one.314 
 
Nashville was unrecognizable, and Owen did not understand why citizens locked themselves away 
in their houses instead of joining the national campaign toward victory in Europe and mobilizing 
to conquer the flu. By October 23, the flu appeared to be receding, as Hibbett told the press “we 
are through the worst of it,” and two days later, Owen found solace in her diary once more.315 She 
survived the flu, and found it abating upon returning to the plant, with patients being transported 
from makeshift hospitals to official ones.316 The flu necessitated the conditions that realized 
Owen’s dream of a city led by female American patriots. Old Hickory’s women battled the flu 
more fiercely than the flu battled Old Hickory. Her coworkers labored tirelessly and never 
capitulated. While she was home, the plant opened 300 positions for women, vacated by the ill. 
Applications even came from outside Tennessee, elsewhere in the South. Ninety-five applicants 
were hired on October 24, one day before her return.317 Nashville’s women, like those in the Red 
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Cross, promised they would “gladly respond” to any future crisis.318 Owen never mentioned the 
flu again, and concluded her diary on January 25, 1919. She, alongside myriad other women, were 
pivotal in facing the deadliest pandemic in modern history. 
 Ft. Oglethorpe’s conditions also improved. Whitaker survived the flu and left the 
quarantine on October 15 after five days. The “Army is OK when you’re well,” he wrote, “but it’s 
a dreary place when you’re not.”319 In Nashville, Mrs. Orr missed the company of friends whom 
she had not heard from. People were still dying, with hospitals “full and overflowing, porches and 
offices, full of beds,” some with only three physicians available.320 She wanted to visit friends, but 
was afraid of spreading the virus, and the infection was still at her doorstep. “We have two new 
cases next door today,” she wrote.321 But by October 22, she was relieved. The flu seemed to be 
disappearing, although it had “taken a far greater toll than the war.”322 Her family was still 
coughing, but they escaped pneumonia. They were going to recover fully. Days later, her husband 
responded, relieved of the passing pandemic. There were no new camp cases, and “orders are being 
received for new men.”323 But tragedy befell most, and the Orrs did not escape it. Mrs. Orr wrote 
solemnly to her husband that his “brother-in-law died this morning of pneumonia,” leaving behind 
“a young wife and three little ones.”324 It was time to restore some sense of normalcy. She hoped 
the quarantine would be lifted by that Sunday, in time for church service. It was. That day, West, 
Hibbett, and Derivaux agreed the public gathering ban be lifted citywide within the week.325  
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 Flu cases procrastinated into winter, as Nashvillians rebuilt their communities and sorted 
the dead. In one home down the street from the Orrs, three bodies were found. “There goes a little 
casket now,” she wrote, as children’s coffins were shuttled up and down the street.326 While the 
whites shed their fears, African Americans still grappled with the flu. On November 5, Mrs. Orr 
observed that cases continued in black neighborhoods.327 Its prevalence was diminishing, but its 
capabilities were not. She knew of four funerals being conducted in one day, while in neighboring 
homes there were “one or two dead and three or four sick.”328 A friend suggested turpentine to 
treat symptoms, but Mrs. Orr’s physician recommended quinine and whiskey, although it seemed 
“plentiful in this part of the country” already.329 She doubted its efficacy.  
 In October, authorities were experimenting with various treatments against the flu and 
reintroduced whiskey as a remedy. On October 9, criminal court Judge J. D. B. DeBow (1861-
1947) ordered law enforcers to reroute captured liquor stocks from Nashville’s bootleggers to 
hospitals and charity clinics, repurposing gallons of alcohol for clinical use.330 Among the 
institutions receiving liquor was Fessey’s hospital with ten cases of liquor, and Old Hickory’s 
DuPont plant with fourteen cases. On October 14, Hibbett ordered whiskey retrievable via a 
physician’s prescription, which was reported to the health office, along with the household’s 
number of sick.331 Some doctors believed the liquor was unhealthy generally, but also threatened 
flu sufferers because some liquor was spiked with chemicals to produce the expected “kick.”332 
They advocated for quality liquor in small doses, rather than careless prescription and overreliance.  
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 Whitaker and the Orrs survived. There were no more tents left in the nearly-deserted Ft. 
Oglethorpe quarantine, but companies were still suffering fatigue from recovery, so they staged 
their own racialized entertainment. “Last night we had a couple of n****** up from Co #12,” 
Whitaker wrote, “one played the guitar while the other danced… the coons were good.”333 While 
racism remained intact, the flu forced authorities to reassess public health. Derivaux believed it 
would be impossible to eliminate a recurrence of the flu. He recommended new resolutions to 
officials, such as prompt disease reporting from physicians, strengthening of laboratory and 
statistical analytics, and sanitary engineering focused on rural Tennessee.334 But in this new war 
against disease, Southern cities needed to overcome more than virions. On New Year’s Day 1919, 
Orr wrote to his wife. “I am glad for the long, bitter, anxious year of 1918 to close,” he said: 
It passed like many other great years have passed – like a disturbed dream to those of us 
who did not suffer calamity, like a nightmare to those who did suffer calamity. The curtain 
was drawn upon a stupefied world that has not yet begun to realize its tremendous losses 
and burdens. Only a study of… history (and they will be written only after many have 
forgotten the shock of it all) can ever reveal… the year’s crimes. And so we go on.335 
 
The testimonies of the Orrs, Whitaker, and Owen are some of the reasons Nashville is integral to 
this study, beyond statistics and official documentation. Their correspondence reveals dimensions 
of the pandemic only whispered by authorities and newspapers: the scale and depth of lethality; 
the unexpectedness, immediacy, and secrecy of the pandemic’s impact; the suffering and anxiety; 
the extent of gender in shaping the pandemic, which had only been hinted at by previous historians. 
Their experiences add to the history of the flu in the South, in which poverty and 
underdevelopment played a leading role in the experience and the outcome. 
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Conclusion: The Flu in the South and the World 
 The South was not a colonial outpost, and belonged to no empire but the American empire, 
which was posed as a contender for superpower nation in 1898 after acquiring Spanish territories 
and ascending the pyramid of international power by 1918, although still strongly isolationist after 
World War I.336 But although the South was part of a developed western country that fared better 
than most, it did not experience the flu in the same way that wealthier, industrialized corners of 
the U.S. did. Just as the pandemic entailed different experiences and results between the U.S. and 
Africa, Latin America, South and East Asia, and the Middle East, the U.S. South experienced the 
flu differently than its continental neighbors to the north and west. Southerners did not enjoy the 
robust health system available in major cities like New York City or Chicago, nor did they have 
egalitarian access to care. Accessible treatment during the pandemic depended on where one lived, 
as in Nashville, where hospitals equipped to treat disease were located beyond city borders, out of 
the range of impoverished residents. Or, as in New Orleans, medical care was race-dependent, and 
discriminatory in its admissions and location of treatment, as in Charity Hospital. In Jacksonville, 
commentary in local newspapers criticized the perceived myth of modern medical care altogether. 
They expected to fight the flu alone, as they had done in epidemics decades prior. 
 But beyond Southern poverty and inaccessible medical care, racial stratification ensured 
discriminatory care and disproportionate mortality between whites and African Americans, 
facilitated by unbalanced medical, housing, and sanitary measures in black neighborhoods. In 
Jacksonville, soup kitchens served families in ways that isolated and excluded African Americans 
from their services by requiring them to fulfill special conditions. Dodd assumed this behavior on 
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the part of whites was typical of the South, and found that high African-American disease mortality 
in New Orleans was solely based on oppressive socioeconomic and political forces constructed by 
the municipal government and the health board, contrary to the arguments of health officers in 
Jacksonville, Savannah, and elsewhere. Instead of blaming black bodies for mortality by relying 
on pseudo-immunology, Dodd implicated poverty, fractured public health infrastructure, 
incompetent city leaders, and unjust housing laws for high African-American mortality.  
The epidemiological assumptions of physicians and officials, nurtured by the undercurrents 
of the eugenics movement, were debated by progressives like Dodd, and Brunner, who himself 
practiced racial paternalism. American medical epistemology evolved in the 1910s, but in the 
South, it still reflected dreams of racial utopia and untamed white supremacy. Authorities 
emboldened their campaign by arguing that inherent weakness explained high African-American 
mortality. By late 1918, the same conditions that fueled imagined epidemiology against African 
Americans also illuminated the disproportionate impact of the flu on impoverished African-
Americans. Indeed, the flu was not the democratic killer historians previously suggested, but 
discriminatory based on conducive Southern social architecture. Race was central to distinguishing 
the Southern flu from the rest of the country. Like most other American epidemics, it may be called 
a ‘white and black’ disease in the South, as much as an imperial one transnationally. 
The cities evaluated in this study were part of a larger history of the global pandemic. Some 
aspects of the pandemic connected the South to the rest of the nation: its ferocity, age distribution, 
and unexpectedness and scale, although these aspects were global as well. In other ways, the flu 
connected the South with the rest of the developing world. High mortality among the impoverished 
and marginalized, isolation and rurality, medical paralysis, and inadequate authority response were 




and the final gasps of conventional colonialism, David Killingray has called the pandemic an 
“imperial disease” that reshaped colonial health administrations, stimulated modern global health 
policy, and illuminated the functionality of imperial health systems, while disproportionately 
killing the destitute and indigenous groups like Native Americans and the Maori.337 
 In South Africa, the pandemic forced the redesign of health infrastructure after hundreds 
died pervasively in crowded slums, with a stark mortality contrast between white and black South 
Africans. South Africa faced the fifth worst flu mortality rate worldwide, with half a million deaths 
in what Howard Phillips calls the single-most destructive event in that country’s demographic 
history.338 In East Africa, food shortages and administrative absenteeism added to the suffering of 
impoverished Kenyans, raising the mortality rate to 25.0 per 1,000 persons, near the rate of 
Nashville and New Orleans.339 Native Kenyans suffered most. In the British Caribbean, Jamaica, 
Belize, and Guyana suffered severely, fueled by the poverty of West Indian laborers and 
indigenous groups.340 British imperialists were indifferent to the plight of their Caribbean colonies 
after the flu, leaving underdevelopment intact. In Bogotá, Colombia, hundreds died due to cyclical 
poverty and useless sanitation precautions, as care was relegated to private institutions like the 
Junta de Socorros.341 And of the 50 to 100 million pandemic deaths worldwide, 10 to 20 million 
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of them were from India, as referred to in the introduction to this study.342 Poverty and 
underdevelopment associated with British colonial rule shaped that exorbitant mortality.  
Between the regional penury, weak public health, and virulent racism in popular and 
medical spheres, the flu experience in the American South was more akin to the pandemic in the 
rest of the developing world than the rest of the U.S. The virus did more than kill millions and spur 
the maturation of national and international health cooperation. It connected the U.S. South with 
the Global South. The trend of recent scholarship pushes against Crosby’s assertions. The work of 
scholars like Svenn-Erik Mamelund, Esyllt Wynne Jones, and Patricia J. Fanning have challenged 
broad assumptions about the pandemic’s mortality by proposing regional studies reflective of the 
nuances of the new social historiography of medicine. Meanwhile, authors like Laura Spinney 
have introduced the flu in global perspective. This thesis has attempted to recast the pandemic in 
similar light by addressing the Southern flu and its social dimensions, while appreciating the South 
as an English-language historical model for the analysis of the global flu, to the degree that 
language limits historical research and full applicability of the model. Future studies of the flu in 
the South and the world will undoubtedly continue the historical gradation beyond Crosby’s work, 
building on that initial bedrock of scholarship towards historicizing contemporary connections in 
applied epidemiology and global health policy. As historians probe the viability of these studies to 
properly address the pandemic, their analyses will undoubtedly further examine the historical 
connection between pestilence and poverty. 
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      Appendix 1: Influenza Mortality Rates for all Fifty-Four FL Counties, Sept. to Dec., 1918.343 
Legend: T = Total W = White B = Black 
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Bay:   T: 
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∙ 103 = 3.1  B: 
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∙ 103 = 5.0 
Bradford:  T: 
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∙ 103 = 4.3  B: 
28
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∙ 103 = 8.0 
Brevard:  T: 
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∙ 103 = 1.4  B: 
6
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∙ 103 = 2.4 
Broward:  T: 
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3
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Calhoun:  T: 
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∙ 103 = 1.8  W: 
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5
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∙ 103 = 2.0 
Citrus:  T: 
19
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∙ 103 = 4.0  B: 
8
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Clay:   T: 
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343 Death data from Thirtieth Annual Report of the State Board of Health of Florida 1918 (Jacksonville: Office of 
the Secretary and Main Laboratory, 1919). Population data from the 1920 Florida Census: Table 9 - Composition & 




Hernando:  T: 
19
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6
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13
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∙ 103 = 5.8  W: 
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Holmes:  T: 
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4
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∙ 103 = 3.8 
Jackson:  T: 
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∙ 103 = 4.3  W: 
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∙ 103 = 6.3 
Jefferson:  T: 
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35
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Lee:   T: 
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Leon:  T: 
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